United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by Mr Mason, the applicant before the London (North) Employment Tribunal sitting on 19th - 21st February 1998, against that tribunal's reserved decision with extended reasons promulgated on 12th March 1998, dismissing his complaint of action short of dismissal taken against him by his employer, the respondent Trust, by reason of his trade union activities contrary to s. 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

The tribunal has set out its findings of fact we think with conspicuous care and clarity. It is only necessary to summarise the main features. The Trust is a charity with responsibility for certain properties. The appellant joined the Trust as a caretaker in 1982. He became a shop steward for the Transport & General Workers Union in 1985, and in 1989 the employees were members of ACTS Management Branch or the ACTS Manual Workers Branch, ACTS being an adjunct to the Transport and General Workers Union.

The two matters of discipline of which the appellant complains arose during the course of 1996 and into 1997. At or about that time there was a move afoot by the respondents to de-recognise ACTS and indeed on 7th October 1996 the management committee decided to take that step. Plainly the appellant was active in opposing any such de-recognition.

The first disciplinary action, the respondents contended, arose out of poor performance and led eventually to a verbal warning against which the appellant appealed internally unsuccessfully. The second matter related to his conduct at a meeting. He made a wholly inappropriate remark about a senior member of the Trust's management. In respect of that second incident, he was initially given a written warning, but on appeal the internal appeal panel reduced that penalty to an oral warning.

The appellant's case was that the disciplinary action taken against him was related to his trade union activities as shop steward. The respondent's case was simply that he was disciplined for the offences for which the penalties were imposed.

The Employment Tribunal carefully directed itself that in discrimination cases such as this, as with sex and race discrimination cases, it will rarely be the case that there will be direct evidence of discriminatory behaviour on the part of the employer, therefore they looked to see whether or not it was proper to draw inferences of such discriminatory behaviour from the primary facts. Having listened to the evidence and considered the documentary evidence over three days, they concluded overall that they preferred the evidence given by the employer's witnesses. They were not prepared to draw the inference that the appellant asked them to draw and they concluded that he was disciplined for the very reasons that the employers said that he was. In these circumstances, they dismissed the complaint.

In this appeal Mr Mason has with considerable care set out points arising out of the evidence given on both sides which he says point ineluctably to the conclusion that the tribunal's decision was perverse. He acknowledges the difficulty faced by an appellant in making out perversity in law. That is to say, that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could come to the conclusion reached by this tribunal.

We have considered that submission and we reject it. In our view the tribunal carefully carried out their fact-finding task. They reached a conclusion, having correctly applied the law, which they were entitled to reach, and there are no grounds, in our view, for us to interfere with that decision. In those circumstances, this appeal must be dismissed.