At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
(AS IN CHAMBERS)
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | THE APPELLANT IN PERSON |
For the Respondents | MR S NEAMAN (of Counsel) Messrs Cameron Markby Hewitt Solicitors Sceptre Court 40 Tower Hill London EC3N 4BB |
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This is a most unfortunate matter. Mr Meme lost a case before an Industrial Tribunal. He lodged a Notice of Appeal which is considered to be out of time. Accordingly, the Registrar had to rule on the question as to whether time should be extended. She refused to extend time. He exercised his undoubted right of appeal against that decision and the matter came on for hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 27th February 1996.
On that occasion a judgment was given by Mummery J, the President, as he then was, in Chambers, and he said this:
"On 8 January 1996 notice of the hearing was sent to the Appellant at the only address in the records of the Tribunal. The notice was returned by the Royal Mail "addressee unknown". The Appeal Tribunal's records do not contain any telephone number for Mr Meme. So we have been unable to contact him to enquire whether he intends to pursue his appeal."
Later on the learned President said this:
"An application has been made for the Appellant to pay the costs of this appeal. The Tribunal has power to order costs where it appears to it that the proceedings were unnecessary, improper or vexatious or there has been unreasonable delay or other unreasonable conduct in bringing or conducting the proceedings. In my judgment, it was unreasonable conduct to bring an appeal against the Registrar's order and then to fail to attend in order to argue the appeal and fail to send to send a representative to argue it. ..."
It is quite clear from an examination of the file in this case that an administrative error was made. The Employment Appeal Tribunal had been fully informed by Mr Meme of his changes of addresses from time to time as they occurred. It is clear that the Notice of Hearing of the appeal against the Registrar's decision was sent to a previous address of his but which was not as we ought to have known his current address. Accordingly when the President said in good faith that the Notice of Hearing was sent to the only address in the records of the tribunal, that was an error. It was sent to the wrong address and it was not sent to the address in the records of the tribunal at that time. Accordingly it is not in the slightest bit surprising that the Notice was returned by the Royal Mail.
It seems to me in those circumstances that the order for costs which my distinguished predecessor made cannot be sustained, because the basis upon which it was made was largely because he had lodged a Notice of Appeal and then failed to attend to argue it or to send a representative to argue it. The truth is that he did not know that an appeal was going to be heard.
There can only be one just result to this matter, which is to quash the order of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and to indicate that we will conduct a review of that decision and to give Mr Meme an opportunity to make his representations to us, where we will decide anew whether time should be extended or not. In other words, whether the appeal against the Registrar's order should be allowed or not.
I am not concerned about the powers of the EAT to take this step. Because it seems to me that the overwhelming interests of justice require that a party should not be prejudiced by a mistake of the sort that has been made in this case. I am therefore happy to make the orders which I have indicated in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court which it has because it is a branch of the High Court having all the powers of the High Court.
Accordingly, that is the direction I give in this case. The appeal will be listed for hearing in the normal way. Mr Meme will be notified in the normal way and as will Lloyds Bank Plc, of the date of that hearing and let battle then commence.