At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HULL QC
MR S M SPRINGER MBE
MR T C THOMAS CBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT |
JUDGE J HULL QC: This is an appeal by Mr Leslie Tierney who describes his occupation as a Drawing Machinist. He was employed by the Respondents at Heckmondwyke in their mill. There came a time when, unhappily, he was made redundant and he issued two claims against his employers. One, the first in time, bears the number 581 at page 8 of our bundle, in that he complains of unfair dismissal and seeks compensation. The second one which he issued was dated 14 February, it is at page 6 of our bundle, and that bears the number ending 600. Both those were proceeding in the Industrial Tribunal.
The employers put in their IT3s - their answers to each claim - and then the Advisory and Conciliation Arbitration Service (ACAS) intervened and, with Mr Tierney being represented by a Solicitor and the Respondents too, negotiations were put in train and, in due course, it appeared that a compromise had been reached. That was the view of all those involved. But Mr Tierney then said, in substance, "I am not prepared to sign the agreement" which was put forward and which we have seen (at page 17 of our papers). Why not? Apparently he said, at some stage at any rate, that he had thought he was compromising only one of his claims, not both of them and the Industrial Tribunal had to deal with that.
Their decision starts at page 3 of our papers. I will not read the whole of it. After setting out the matters which I have mentioned they say an offer was made, and they say the Respondents' Solicitor communicated the offer to ACAS, by its officer, Nicola Wilson, and that lady, acting as go-between, then communicated the offer back to Solicitors who were acting on behalf of Mr Tierney. That was rejected. Then there was a second offer made. It was intended, apparently, to compromise both matters and those terms were accepted. Then the Tribunal refer to what happened thereafter. Ms Wilson drafted a form and they set out the terms:
"Without admission of liability, the respondent agrees to pay the applicant the sum of £1,500... in full and final settlement of any claim the applicant may have against the respondent arising from his contract of employment or the termination thereof."
Then they say "for his part the Applicant gave evidence today. The Chairman explained to him that he could exercise his right not to disclose what had been said between him and his Solicitor but he chose to waive that right, not least because he needed to do so in order to explain his case".
"Essentially his case is that there was a misunderstanding between him and his Solicitor, Mr Henshaw. He had been advised that he should first present a complaint of unfair dismissal and await the outcome of that complaint before proceeding with the separate claim that he was entitled to a redundancy payment."
If we may say so, rather curious advice, but that is what the advice was, he says. "He accepts", said the Chairman,
"that when the offer was made, Mr Henshaw did tell him that it would be in full and final settlement of all claims. When Mr Henshaw presented the Form COT 3" which contains the settlement " for his signature, he refused to sign it on learning that the agreement embraced both his outstanding claim of unfair dismissal and his potential claim of entitlement to a redundancy payment."
Then the Tribunal say they have been referred to legal authorities, which they look at. They say:
"The principle here is that an oral agreement reached as a result of a conciliation officer having taken action under Section 18 of the Industrial Tribunals Act 1996 is not rendered void by Section 203 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. It is not a condition precedent to the existence of the agreement that it should be evidenced by the parties executing a Form COT 3." (That is the formal form which he had refused to sign) "Furthermore, having instructed a solicitor to act for him, that solicitor has ostensible authority to negotiate on his behalf. The respondent is not obliged to examine the extent of that solicitor's authority and can rely on the authority as it is held out.
In those circumstances, we find that an oral agreement amounting in the law to a contract was concluded... [and the] terms were accepted on behalf of the applicant."
Therefore they had, as they record, to stay the proceedings in both Applications.
Now Mr Tierney wishes to appeal. He says it was not made plain to him by his Solicitor. He puts it like this, very frankly,
"I am not appealing against the decision the tribunal made against me, but I did not explain to them that when my solicitor Mr Henshaw phoned me up at work that he did not explain that the £1500 was for both claims and I had the impression it was for unfair dismissal so I agreed that the £1500 was fair settlement. So when I went to sign the form at his office I did not realise that the settlement were for both and I said I would not agree to the £1500 for both claims."
Then there come the grounds upon which his appeal is brought. The form says:
"The grounds upon which this appeal is brought are that the industrial tribunal erred in law in that..."
and this Appellant uniquely - certainly in my experience - very frankly writes:
"None."
He could not be more correct about that. There are no grounds for this appeal. The fact is that a Solicitor or Barrister instructed by a party always has authority to settle a case unless he is expressly instructed not to do so. This Solicitor, clearly acting well within his authority, did settle it. It appears from what Mr Tierney now says that he failed to explain the matter properly to Mr Tierney and if that is so, and I say "if", we are certainly not saying it is so, but if that is so then Mr Tierney may have a perfectly good complaint against his Solicitor. But that is nothing to do with the Respondents and nothing to do with the Industrial Tribunal, as Mr Tierney himself realises.
In the circumstances this appeal must fail. Therefore we order that it should be dismissed now.