At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
MR P DAWSON OBE
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | MS J EADY (of Counsel) Messrs Thompsons Solicitors Congress House Great Russell Street London WC1B 3LW |
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to identify whether there are arguable points of law to be raised against, effectively, two decisions of an Industrial Tribunal.
Mrs Gibson is employed by East Riding Yorkshire Council. She made a complaint to an Industrial Tribunal saying that she had not been given proper particulars, in writing, of her terms and conditions of employment. She also said that she had been the victim of an unlawful deduction of wages by the Respondents, and that related to her claim that she was entitled to holiday pay by virtue of the Working Time Directive.
The Industrial Tribunal, having heard submissions, acceded to her complaint in relation to particulars of employment and specified them in paragraph 5 of their decision, but rejected her complaint that there had been an unlawful deduction of wages, on the basis as we understand it, that the Working Time Directive was not drafted in such a way, as to give directly enforceable rights to individuals who are employed by emanations of the State in the Member States.
The reasoning of the Industrial Tribunal on that issue is set out at paragraph 8 of its decision. The decision itself is expressed to be in summary form, both because of the heading "Summary Reasons" and because of paragraph 1 of the decision. Outside the time limit, but only about 14 days outside it, the Applicant asked the Industrial Tribunal to give extended reasons on the grounds essentially that there was an important point at issue which was fit for an appeal and that it would be appropriate that extended reasons should be given. Purely because of the time limit point, extended reasons were refused by the Industrial Tribunal, that is its second decision.
It seems to us at this stage firstly, that it would be competent for the Employment Appeal Tribunal to adjudicate on the substantive issues raised in the appeal, as outlined in Ms Eady's skeleton argument, because the summary reasons of the Industrial Tribunal are in sufficiently full form to enable us to do justice between the parties and accordingly, in that sense, the second appeal which relates to the Tribunal's refusal to give extended reasons does not fall, as it seems to us, for determination at a full hearing. But that said, it would be right in our judgment, that the Industrial Tribunal Chairman should be given the opportunity to produce the Tribunal's extended reasons if that is what he wishes to do, before this matter comes on for hearing.
I direct therefore, that the learned Chairman be written to and told that leave has been given at a preliminary hearing stage for the matter to proceed to a full hearing and to ask whether he would wish to give extended reasons, pointing out to him that in the absence of extended reasons, nonetheless the Employment Appeal Tribunal will consider the appeal on the basis of the summary reasons which we currently have.
It seems to us that no notes of evidence will be required for the hearing of this appeal. There is no appeal in relation to the matter on which Mrs Gibson succeeded. It seems to us, therefore, that the Respondent's request in relation to notes of evidence is not pertinent to the issues raised in the Notice of Appeal.
The estimate of time, it seems to me, should be one day. It is plainly an appeal which has potential important consequences, not just for the parties themselves, but on a much wider basis and that being so, in my view it should be dealt with, either by myself or by a High Court Judge sitting here because, as I understand it, this may be the first occasion on which a judgment has to be made about the legal effect, if any, of the Working Time Directive.
The lay members with whom I am sitting now, after discussion with me, have expressed a wish to sit at the substantive hearing of this appeal, if that can conveniently be arranged, and the President would welcome their assistance in this case.