United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR S NEAMAN (of Counsel) Messrs Simpson Miller Solicitors 101 Borough High Street London Bridge London SE1 1NL
For the Respondents


 


JUDGE J HULL QC: The Tribunal, having enquired with exceptional thoroughness into the facts, came to the conclusion that the failure of the employer to consult with or take evidence from the police was a failure which would not represent unfairness, that the great majority of employers would not go to that step in all the circumstances of the case.

It is alleged by Mr Neaman that that finding itself was wrong in law. The police, having attended the incident, said there was no evidence. It seems to us, bearing in mind that there were two witnesses, the alleged victim and his passenger, who said that an assault had taken place (and the employers had ,of course, heard evidence from others and done all sorts of things in the course of their enquiries), that we have no ground whatever for saying that it is arguable, as a matter of law, that the employer was unfair in failing to consult further with the police or to take evidence from the police.

The final point on which the Appellant wishes to appeal is a contention of perversity and Mr Neaman, in his skilful argument for which we are very grateful, says that in holding that the primary evidence of the Appellant's guilt is so clear, the Industrial Tribunal made a finding of fact that no reasonable Industrial Tribunal properly directing itself to the evidence could have come to.

But it seems to us that that is adopting an approach to evidence which is perhaps more worthy of a Civil Law country or, perhaps, Scotland, where they approach more closely to Civil Law jurisdictions. The fact is that in English Law one witness is, in general, enough and here there were two witnesses saying an assault had taken place. It is not for us, of course, to say whether the evidence was clear. The Tribunal looked at all the evidence and spent a great deal of time and trouble over it. They thought that the primary evidence was clear. Of course, like any other evidence, it can be rebutted, but it seems to us that there is nothing there to indicate that this Tribunal was guilty of perversity.

We give leave on the following matters, referring to them in Mr Neaman's argument:

On his point 1, that the formal minuted discipline interview was unfair and flawed. As a matter of law it was not open to the Industrial Tribunal to hold that this did not render the subsequent dismissal unfair. That, we think, is fairly and properly arguable.

The second point on which we give leave is Mr Neaman's second point, the vehicle test. We think, again, it is arguable that the way in which the test was carried out and the failure to inform the Appellant and his representatives of the test and to allow them to carry out a test all that is fairly arguable as being something which is an error of law, when the Tribunal excused that, and held that that was fair.

We have said all we need to, I hope, about the police. With regard to perversity, we do not give leave there but we give leave on the fourth point, the question whether the defects were cleared on the appeal to Mr Tomson. We think, again, that the points which are argued there are fairly arguable and should proceed to a full hearing.

So we give leave, by referring to the skeleton argument, on points 1, 2 and 4, on the ground that they are, in our view, fairly arguable in law.