At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE H J BYRT QC
MR L D COWAN
MS D WARWICK
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | Mr S Illingworth (of Counsel) |
JUDGE JOHN BYRT QC: This is an appeal against a decision promulgated on the 8 January 1998 of an Employment Tribunal sitting at London North, when they came to the conclusion that the employee, Mrs Sabar had not been unfairly dismissed nor had she been discriminated against by reason of her race. Mrs Sabar appeals, not against the dismissal of the claim for racial discrimination, but solely on the question of unfair dismissal.
Quite shortly the situation is that Mrs Sabar was employed by the Respondents under a fixed term contract which was renewed, and then expired on 21 July 1997. Prior to that time there had been a curtailment in the funding of the Respondents' organisation. Mrs Sabar's job was selected as a post which could be dispensed with, resulting in some savings for the Respondents. Accordingly the decision was made not to renew her contract on 21 July 1997.
The first point argued on behalf of Mrs Sabar is that the Tribunal erred in law in finding as they did, in paragraph 9 of their decision, that:
"It was not incumbent upon the Respondent to renew this contract."
We are of the view that this statement raises an arguable point of law. The Tribunal which hears the full appeal will have to consider the terms and provisions of section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1976 to see whether that proposition is right. If it comes to the conclusion that the failure to renew the contract did amount to a dismissal, then the Tribunal will have to consider whether that dismissal was fair or unfair, and in that context whether the dismissal was for some other substantial reason or for redundancy. If it was for redundancy, they would have to consider whether the Respondents had followed through the appropriate procedures to make the dismissal for redundancy, fair. In all, there are a number of points here which we think are strongly arguable by the Appellant, and accordingly we give leave for this matter to forward for a full hearing before this Tribunal.