United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
For the Respondent	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): In May of 1997 at a pre-hearing review, conducted by an Industrial Tribunal, having looked at the facts of his complaint against his employers, the Industrial Tribunal required the applicant to advance a deposit of £50. The Industrial Tribunal hearing then took place on 14th August 1997.

The appellant, Mr Curtis, was represented by an officer from the Citizens Advice Bureau. His employers were represented by Counsel. It appears that there were discussions which took place on that date. So far as the Industrial Tribunal was concerned, the outcome was that the application was withdrawn and it was withdrawn in circumstances whereby the £50 deposit was repaid to Mr Curtis.

The Industrial Tribunal, in accordance with their normal practice when an application is withdrawn, then recorded that fact in a decision, namely:

"(i) The complaint of unfair dismissal having been withdrawn the application is dismissed.

(ii) The deposit paid by the Applicant shall be returned to him."

On 4th September 1997 the appellant's solicitors wrote to him and indicated that the time limit for an appeal was 42 days from the date when the decision was sent, namely 19th August 1997, and they indicated that they would place in their diary a note that action would have to be taken by that date.

What then happened was that a Notice of Appeal was faxed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 30th September 1997 and on the same day a letter was sent to us which said this:

"Further to our faxed letter of today's date enclosing copy Notice of Appeal against the Decision of the Industrial Tribunal, Mr Curtis has since instructed us that he wishes to withdraw his appeal."

Accordingly, in accordance with our Practice, on 3rd October 1997 it was ordered that leave be granted for the appeal to be withdrawn and the appeal was thereby dismissed.

There had been an application for Legal Aid and on 5th November 1997 the Legal Aid Board notified the appellant and his solicitors that Legal Aid had been refused.

On 14th November 1997, I think, the appellant sent to the Legal Aid authority a Notice of Appeal against their refusal. On 6th December 1997 the appellant wrote to us a letter which we received on 12th December 1997, asking for leave to appeal out of time. He said he first instructed the firm of solicitors on Friday, 29th August and instructed them to appeal to have his case heard at an Industrial Tribunal. He complains, in this document, that effectively, he was put under pressure at the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal to withdraw the case; that he was a postman, that he has lost a job which is not only of value to him but formed an essential part of his life; and, as he put it, he has had little knowledge of Industrial Tribunal procedure and was too ill to represent himself, and that he has had a life sentence imposed on him.

On 8th January 1998 the appeal against the Legal Aid Board's refusal was allowed to a limited extent, namely that Legal Aid was granted:

"Limited to obtaining Counsel's Opinion on the information already available. To include the settling of the appropriate pleadings/affidavit if counsel so advise."

On 14th January 1998, in response to our suggestion that he was seeking to reactivate an appeal which had been withdrawn, he said that he had successfully appealed the decision of the Legal Aid Authority and that he had not been competently advised by his solicitors.

There has been no appearance either by the appellant or by the respondent in this case. I therefore deal with this appeal on the basis of the papers before me.

It seems to me that this is not a case where we can or should entertain the application which is made to us, either to withdraw the withdrawal of the appeal which was lodged within time, or to lodge a fresh appeal outside the time limit.

I take that view in the exercise of my discretion on the basis that Mr Curtis through solicitors who had authority, so far as we are concerned, to act on his behalf, told us that the original appeal was to be withdrawn. The withdrawal of it was confirmed by an appropriate order of this Court. There is nothing that has happened since then to justify in re-opening the appeal, in my judgment. There is no indication that Mr Curtis has any arguable point of law which he would wish to make, assuming that he was entitled to advance an appeal. I am always sympathetic to people who have lost their employment in circumstances which affects their life, as I accept in this case it has, but we are bound by rules of procedure which are designed to reflect justice on both sides of the equation, not just the appellant but also the respondent. In these circumstances, I am not prepared to extend time or to permit the appellant to withdraw the withdrawal of his appeal.