United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE LEVY QC: An Industrial Tribunal received an application dated 18th March 1997 from Mr Martin Patterson claiming that he had the subject of race discrimination. His employer was the Nottinghamshire County Council. The Council put in its appearance alleging that there had been no such discrimination. There was a hearing of Mr Patterson's complaint on 12th November and 15th December 1997. At that hearing Mr Patterson was represented by a friend, and the County Solicitor represented the Council. At the end of the hearing the Chairman's was reserved; it was promulgated on 14th January 1998. It was a unanimous decision of the Tribunal that the Council did not unlawfully discriminate against Mr Patterson.

From that decision Mr Patterson appealed by a Notice of Appeal dated 17th February 1998 in which he was assisted by the Nottingham Law Centre. The grounds of appeal set out are these:

"The Tribunal's conclusion that the Applicant had not been subject to racial abuse by Mr Alison was perverse in that the Tribunal's findings were influenced by the fact that Mr Alison had immediately apologised for the statement he made.

In respect of the statement made by Mrs Comer, that as long as she worked at County Hall the Applicant would not get a regrade, the Tribunal should have found as a finding of fact for the Applicant on this point. The Applicant's recollection of this was clear, although Mrs Comer stated that she had no recollection.

The Tribunal erred in finding that the comparators put forward by the Applicant could not be properly compared was erroneous, similarly the Tribunal erred in finding that the disestablished post should be excluded was not a factor that the Tribunal should have taken into account.

The Tribunal erred in finding that there was no evidence of racist mail received by the Applicant originating from the Respondent or any of their employees. The Tribunal was wrong in law to draw no inference from its receipt. Bearing in mind the circumstances surrounding the case, it was likely that an employee of the Respondent fomented the origination of the hate mail."

On each of these grounds of appeal for the ex parte hearing of his appeal, Mr Patterson has with great firmness addressed in the course of this morning. He has made the points in modest tones and very articulately.

So far as the first ground of appeal is concerned, we do not find the decision of the tribunal perverse reading it from top to bottom as each of us have. The particular finding is not perverse. What the tribunal say in paragraph 26 of the extended reasons as to Mr Alison is this:

"26. ... The Tribunal do find, however, that Mr Allison lost his self control and abused [Mr Patterson] during an interview on 7 February 1997 but accept that this behaviour was out of character and by reason of stress arising out of distressing personal circumstances. He quickly apologised to the Applicant. The Tribunal prefer his evidence to that of the Applicant that there was no racial word or phrase used by him during his outburst."

That is a decision on evidence which the tribunal was entitled to reach and it is one on which no appeal is possible. As we explained to Mr Patterson during the course of his submissions, it is the duty of a tribunal to make findings of fact and decide which evidence they accept and which evidence they reject; unless the findings are so clearly wrong that no reasonable tribunal could have come to the decision which the Industrial Tribunal did, then it is not appealable. An applicant is entitled to a day in court, he is not entitled to a rehearing of the case.

Similarly, in respect of the second ground of appeal, there was a finding of fact by the tribunal that Miss Comer did not make the alleged remarks, and she had not acted in a discriminatory manner. That was a finding, grounded on evidence, the Tribunal was entitled to make.

"... The Applicant concedes that the Appeal Panel have not been discriminatory."

In his address to us Mr Patterson suggested that no such concession had been made as is recorded at the end of paragraph 15 of the Extended reasons. That is not something raised in the Notice of Appeal and, in those circumstances, we cannot look at it at this stage. But in any event, the answer to the complaint is found in paragraphs 22 to 24 when there is a finding that there was no discrimination when the tribunal consider each of the applications made by Mr Patterson and the way they were treated by the Council.

As to the final ground of appeal, the tribunal, we were told, looked at the mail which unfortunately Mr Patterson had received, and in the circumstances of the case, were not willing to draw the inference which Mr Patterson asked them to draw. That was a decision to which they were entitled to come and in the circumstances it is not one with which we are entitled to interfere.

All these grounds of appeal raise points of fact which were properly decided against Mr Patterson in the tribunal below. In these circumstances, we can see no grounds for this appeal to go ahead. Accordingly, we dismiss it at this stage.

JUDGE LEVY: Mr Patterson has sought leave to appeal. Leave to appeal is refused.