United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON
For the Respondents	MISS A WEEKES (of Counsel) Instructed by: Mr E M Holdsworth The County Secretary West Sussex County Council County Hall Chichester West Sussex PO19 1RQ


 


JUDGE BYRT QC: This is an appeal from an interlocutory decision made by an Industrial Tribunal Chairman sitting in Brighton. His decision which he notified the parties by letter dated 12th February 1998, was to the effect that this case listed with a time estimate of nine or ten days, should commence in the week commencing 20th April 1998 and, then if necessary, should recommence in the week commencing 18th May 1998, save and except for one day when the Chairman who has been allocated this case would be unable to sit namely on 21st May 1998. In all, this order made nine days available for hearing this case. This order displaced an order, made on 21st January 1998, when the Chairman listed the case to commence, as now, on 20th April 1998, but on that occasion he listed the second week to commence on 5th May 1998. It is right to observe that 5th May 1998 was a Tuesday, and accordingly, the dates then fixed also allowed just the nine days.

Mrs Unwin has brought this application. She has in correspondence both with the Regional Chairman and also the President of the Industrial Tribunals, voiced a number of anxieties and concerns she has about the alteration of the dates ordered on 21st January 1998.

The way the date came to be altered is as follows. Miss Weekes, Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in this matter, caused a letter to be written on 3rd February 1998, in which mention was made that she was going to be in difficulties because she has been instructed in a long, lengthy and important enquiry elsewhere. In that same letter of 3rd February, there was also mentioned that there was a difficulty about the availability of a particular witness. When that letter was received, it was drawn to the attention of Mrs Unwin, and she replied by letter dated 5th February 1998. We have not got a copy of that letter, but it is plain from the decision letter which the Regional Chairman wrote on 12th February 1998, that he had got a copy of Mrs Unwin's letter of 5th February 1998; that he fully appreciated all the points she was making, including the fact that she quite plainly objected to an alteration in the dates. He also had in mind, because the letter of 12th February 1998 says so, that she was concerned about the gap between the two hearing dates being extended from one week to a three week period. In arguing her case before us today, this remains one of her main concerns.

I would first of all like, I hope without sounding patronising, to compliment Mrs Unwin for the clarity, articularity, and if I may so, moderation with which she has argued her application on this appeal. The case quite obviously causes her considerable distress. But the first point she has made in argument before us today, is the same as the one she made in her letter of 5th February 1998, namely about the extension of the gap from one week to three weeks. The other point she made clear today, is that she is concerned that, once these dates are accepted, for some reason or other, possibly through Miss Weekes' involvement with the enquiry, there will yet be a further adjournment and alteration in dates.

Dealing with each of those points in turn. So far as the gap is concerned, I think Mrs Unwin must understand that the sort of time gap we are considering in this case is one with which Chairmen have regularly to cope with. Very often a gap between hearings is a matter of several months. The Chairman of the tribunal has detailed notes of the evidence given and, before a resumed hearing, will refresh his or her memory as to the evidence given on the earlier occasion, and those of the members too. So on that ground, we think the extension of the period from one week to three weeks, is not really something which is going to be a final determinant of this matter.

So far as the uncertainty of the dates which the Regional Chairman has now selected: we were particularly concerned, when Miss Weekes got up to address us, that any further alteration in dates which might be necessary should not be dependent upon her availability. We were impressed by Miss Weekes when she addressed us. She clearly is mindful of her obligations as a member of the Bar. If there is going to be a clash of dates in the future, she has to make the decision which brief she is going to return. She made plain to us that these latest dates ordered are fixed so far as she is concerned, and she would not be arguing her particular cause in future for any alteration or variation.

In addition to that, there was a problem about the availability of witnesses. There was a witness named Mr Fry who the respondents understood Mrs Unwin would call. He was not available for 5th May 1998. Mrs Unwin has now indicated that she does not want that witness called, and so that problem falls away as well.

There was one other problem relating to another witness who has unhappily had to undergo major surgery. The evidence is that he will not be available to do anything other than light duties before the end of April 1998, and will not be fully recovered until the end of May 1998. The shifting of the date to 18th May 1998 will be a kind and sensible thing so far as that witness is concerned. I am quite sure, having regard to the way Mrs Unwin responded to that information, that every latitude will be extended to him to enable him to give his evidence with the least possible stress.

At the end of the day, this tribunal has to consider whether the Chairman who altered the dates on 12th February 1998 acted reasonably in exercising his discretion.

We are an appellate court here. We cannot interfere with a judge or a tribunal Chairman who exercises his discretion reasonably and judicially. It may be that if we were sitting on this matter afresh ourselves, we would not have come to the same conclusion. That is totally beside the point. It is perfectly possible that a Chairman, considering this matter afresh, might come to a reasonable decision, with which another reasonable person might disagree but that does not mean either are unreasonable. We do not think that this particular Chairman in the exercise of his discretion acted unreasonably in coming to the decision he did. We are confident that he took into account all the points made by Mrs Unwin, and also the points made on behalf of the respondents. That being the case, we do not think that we can disturb his decision.

We would like, as I have said, to compliment Mrs Unwin, as to the legitimacy of the points that she has raised, but at the end of day, we feel that they are not points which can ultimately determine this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss that appeal.