At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
(IN CHAMBERS)
EAT/24/98 BOXSHALL & OTHERS |
APPELLANTS |
RESPONDENTS | |
EAT/25/98 MR A ENGLAND |
APPELLANT |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellants | MR A ENGLAND Devondale Carr Lane Sutton-on-the-Forest York YO6 1EB |
For the Respondent (PTC) |
PROFESSOR J BEATSON (of Counsel) Messrs Russell Jones & Walker Solicitors Swinton House 324 Grays Inn Road London WC1X 8DH |
For the Respondent (CPSA) |
MR B LANGSTAFF QC Messrs Pattison & Brewer Solicitors 30 Great James Street London WC1N 3HA |
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): There are a number of matters with which I must now deal. The first relates to the terms of the order which must be made. As to that, in relation to the first appeal, I shall simply make an order dismissing the appeal.
In relation to the second appeal, using the powers that we have under the Industrial Tribunal's Act 1996, we make a declaration that the Certification Officer himself would have made under Section 103(3)(a) of the Act that the PTC were in breach of Section 100E (6) by failing to give the members a copy of the report, or notify them of its contents by providing a summary thereof. The precise language will have to be drafted by Counsel.
In relation to Section 103(3)(b) I accept the undertaking, which Counsel has given on behalf of the PTC, to send a copy of the full report of the scrutineers to those members whose names appear on the current list of members, and that that process will be completed by close of business, that is 4.00 pm London time, 10 March 1998.
Again, I shall wish to see and sign a carefully worded undertaking, drafted by Counsel on behalf of the PTC, and on that basis the Court will not make any order under Section 103(3)(b).
Mr England has asked for leave to appeal, firstly in relation to the first appeal on which he completely failed. He says that there is an issue of law which he wishes to have determined. In my judgment this is not an appropriate case for leave to appeal. Although impressed by the way he conducted the argument, we have to say that we were less impressed by the substance of his argument on the first appeal, and we believe the law to be reasonably clear and its application to the facts in this case not to be seriously in doubt.
There is an important question of timing in this case. The two Unions are preparing for amalgamation, which they hope will come to fruition in the very near future, and arrangements of a long-term nature have been made on the assumption that the amalgamation will go through. I am satisfied, from what I have been told, that if those arrangements have to be unscrambled, there may be costs involved, and, certainly, a great deal of administrative inconvenience.
The Certification Officer will wish to register the instrument of amalgamation as soon as he may properly do so. He has taken the view, very properly in our judgment, that he should not register the instrument before Mr England's complaint has been finally determined, including that is an appeal to the EAT and we anticipate that he might well take the same view were Mr England to be granted leave to appeal by the Court of Appeal.
Accordingly, it seems to me to be correct that we should indicate to Mr England that if he wishes to make an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, he should apply extremely promptly. We indicate to the Certification Officer that, if by close of business on 10 March, Mr England has not been given leave to appeal by the Court of Appeal, then subject to being satisfied about such other matters as he wishes to take into account, he should be entitled to register the instrument of amalgamation at that time.
The effect of this will be to require Mr England, if he wishes to pursue his appeal, to do so with all due dispatch and, no doubt, the Court of Appeal will fully recognise the urgency of this matter if it receives any such application.
In relation to the second appeal, formally Mr England asks for leave to appeal against our refusal to make or direct the Certification Officer to make an order under Section 103(3)(b). As was submitted to us, the issue on this appeal was very much a question of the exercise of a discretion and is not a matter which we think should be advanced any further beyond the Employment Appeal Tribunal. We would refuse leave for that reason, and on the question of time what we have said on the first appeal applies equally to the second.
In other words, as it seems to us, unless the Court of Appeal have, by the close of business on 10 March, given leave to appeal, then the Certification Officer shall be entitled to register the instrument of amalgamation.