United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MISS JENNIFER EADY (of Counsel) Instructed by: Ms S Gilbert (Solicitor) NUJ Acorn House 314-320 Gray's Inn Road London WC1X 8DP


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: Between 23rd May 1994 and 16th December 1996 the appellant, Ms Stevens, worked for the respondent in the capacity of Art Director. Following termination she presented a complaint of unfair constructive dismissal to an Industrial Tribunal. The respondent took a preliminary point that the appellant had not completed two years qualifying service as an employee so as to found the tribunal's jurisdiction to hear her complaint.

That issue was heard and determined by a Chairman sitting alone at the London (North) Industrial Tribunal on 12th November 1997. For the extended reasons given with a decision promulgated on 18th December 1997 he found that the appellant had not completed two years service and dismissed the complaint. Against that decision the appellant now appeals.

It was the respondent's case below that between 23rd May 1994 and 1st April 1995 the appellant was engaged under a series of freelance contracts for services. It was accepted that from 1st April 1995 she was an employee.

At this preliminary hearing Miss Eady takes essentially three points. First, that the Chairman attached impermissible significance to the label "freelance" and did not investigate the nature of the relationship between the parties during the relevant period prior to 1st April 1995; secondly, that the Chairman gave insufficient reasons for his conclusion that the appellant was not an employee prior during that period; and finally, that the decision was perverse.

As to the label, it is clear from paragraph 6 of the extended reasons that the Chairman was alive to the principle that the label which the parties attached to their relationship, here, "freelance", will not be conclusive. It is necessary to examine the factors pointing for and against employment status. That is what this Chairman proceeded to do in that paragraph of his reasons. He weighed by the "pros and cons" and came down in favour of self-employed status for the period prior to 1st April 1995. In our judgment that was a permissible conclusion. In particular, it seems to us that he looked at the change in the terms of engagement following the 1st April 1995, and was able to conclude that there was indeed a change in the nature of the relationship between the parties after that date. We can only interfere with what is essentially a finding of fact as to employment status if that conclusion is shown to be perverse. In our view, that is not the case here. Further, we are satisfied that the factors identified by the Chairman going both ways did not point inevitably, as Miss Eady submits, to the conclusion that this was indeed a contract of service from the outset. Finally, we are satisfied that the Chairman has given sufficient reasons to explain to the parties why they have won and lost.

In these circumstances, we reject each of the arguments advanced by Miss Eady, and conclude that this appeal discloses no arguable point of law to go forward to a full appeal hearing and accordingly, it must be dismissed.