United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: On 26 February 1997 the Appellant, Miss McLaughlin, a law lecturer presented a complaint of unfair dismissal, sex discrimination and a claim under the Equal Pay Act to an Industrial Tribunal against (1) North Tyneside College Corporation (the College) and (2) Education Lecturing Services Ltd (ELS).

The matter came before a Chairman, Mr N.W. Garside, sitting alone at the Newcastle Industrial Tribunal on 30 and 31 July 1997. In a reserved decision with full reasons promulgated on 27 October 1997 the Chairman decided various preliminary issues as follows:

"(1) The applicant's employment by the first respondent was terminated on 7 July 1995.

(2) The applicant's employment did not transfer from the first respondent to the second respondent within the meaning of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.

(3) The applicant was not an employee of the second respondent within the definition of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

(4) The applicant was employed under a contract personally to exercise work or labour for the second respondent within the definition of section 82 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.

(5) The applicant was employed under a contract personally to execute work or labour for the second respondent within the definition of section 1(6) of the Equal Pay Act 1970.

(6) The claim by the applicant that she was sexually discriminated by the first respondent was not presented within the time limit of section 76(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and in all the circumstances it is not just and equitable for the time for the presentation of the claim to be extended."

The sole issue raised by the Appellant in this appeal is whether the Chairman was wrong in law in finding in paragraph 46 of the reasons that the Appellant was not employed by the College after 7 July 1995 within the meaning of Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The factual background, so the Chairman found, was that the Appellant lectured part-time in law at the College, among other educational establishments, from October 1993 until her employment was terminated by reason of redundancy on 7 July 1995. During that period she was employed by the College on a series of part-time temporary contracts.

Thereafter she continued to lecture at the College part-time until 19 December 1996 under the following arrangement. The College and ELS entered into a contract whereby ELS provided lecturers when and as required by the College.

The Appellant entered into a written contract with ELS whereby she registered with them. It was a term of that contract that she would carry out assignments on a self-employed basis. She was remunerated by ELS for work done by a VAT inclusive fee.

It was submitted by the Appellant below, and recorded in paragraph 24 of the Chairman's reasons, that the contractual relations between the College and ELS were a sham used to evade the College's employment liabilities to the Appellant.

The Chairman rejected that submission, and in paragraph 46 of his reasons he concluded that after July 1995 there was no direct contractual relationship between the Appellant and the College.

In this appeal Miss McLaughlin submits that after July 1995 she carried on working at the College in precisely the same way as before and that, in truth, she continued in the College's employment so that her period of continuous employment with the College ran from October 1993 until December 1996.

We are unable to accept that submission. In our judgment the Chairman was entitled to accept the new contractual arrangements involving the College, the Appellant and ELS on face value. From July 1995 there was no contract between the Appellant and the College; contracts existed only between the College and ELS and between ELS and the Appellant.

In these circumstances no question of the distinction between a contract of service and a contract for services between the Appellant and the College arises.

In our judgment there is no arguable point of law disclosed in this appeal and accordingly it must be dismissed.