United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MISS T DAY (Solicitor) Sandom Robinson Solicitors 226 Rye lane Peckham London SE15 4NL


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: We have before us two appeals by the applicant before the London (South) Industrial Tribunal, Mrs Bentley. The first appeal in time lies against the tribunal's substantive decision to dismiss her complaint of unfair dismissal brought against the respondent for the summary reasons promulgated with a decision dated 27th August 1997. That was an appeal by Notice dated 3rd October 1997.

The second appeal, by a notice dated 14th November 1997, lies against the Industrial Tribunal Chairman's refusal, contained in a letter dated 10th November, to provide extended reasons for the substantive decision following a request made out of time by a letter from the appellant's solicitors dated 22nd October 1997.

The background is as follows. The appellant was employed by the respondent as a Residential Social Worker from 21st February 1994 until her dismissal on 3rd February 1997.

The tribunal, in their summary reasons, found that the reason for dismissal was redundancy and that her dismissal was fair. It was a genuine redundancy, a fair procedure was followed, she was given the opportunity to apply for alternative positions. She did not do so.

Taking the second appeal first, it is accepted by Miss Day on behalf of the appellant, who appeared in person below, that the application for extended reasons fell outside the 21 day period provided for in Rule 10(4)(c)(ii) of the Industrial Tribunal Rules of Procedure. She submits that the Chairman's refusal to extend time for providing extended reasons is contrary to the interests of justice, alternatively she asks us to allow the appeal to proceed on summary reasons only under our powers contained in Employment Appeal Tribunal Rule 39(2). see Wolesley Centres Ltd v Simons [1994] ICR 503.

As to the refusal to extend time. It is a matter falling very much within the Chairman's exercise of discretion. It will be rare for such exercise of discretion to be successfully challenged on appeal as Phillips J pointed out in. Ryan Plant International Ltd v Price [1976] ICR 424. In our judgment this is not one of those rare cases and we are not prepared to contemplate an appeal based on the premise that the Chairman's exercise of discretion was perverse.

As to the appeal proceeding on summary reasons only, we have to consider the grounds of appeal in the first substantive appeal. These come down mainly to an attack on the Industrial Tribunal's assessment of the evidence before them and also the tribunal's acquiescence to an application by the respondent to remove a document from the trial bundle which the appellant argues was highly material to the issues in this case. In these circumstances it would not be right, we think, to adjudicate on those grounds of appeal on the basis of summary reasons only. Therefore in the exercise of our discretion we will not permit the appeal to proceed on that basis.

It therefore follows that both appeals must be dismissed at this preliminary hearing stage.