United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE LINDSAY: Mr D Dass is before us today in person in an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Tribunal, sitting at Stratford, under the Chairmanship of Ms B A Land, which was promulgated on 11th September 1997 after a hearing spread over some five days in July 1997.

Mr Dass's IT1 - his form complaint - under the heading of "full details of your complaint" extended to an admirable 15 lines. The unanimous decision of the Industrial Tribunal was that Mr Dass's complaint of racial discrimination was dismissed.

Now we have before us Mr Dass's Notice of Appeal which spreads itself over 17 pages of single-spaced typewriting. To that he adds a affidavit of some 13½ single-spaced pages of typing and his skeleton argument is five typed pages.

The Practice Direction (Employment Appeal Tribunal - Procedure) 1996 - (looking at page [5040] of Butterworths Employment Law Handbook) - says this - Regulation 2(3):

"The Notice of Appeal must clearly identify the point of law which forms the ground of appeal [our emphasis] from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the EAT. It may also state the Order which the Appellant will ask the EAT to make at the hearing."

The existing material, in our view, fails to identify with any clarity the points of law relied upon, if only because there is so much other material that it is hard to see what could be a point of law. It also refers, at exorbitant length, to matters which are quite plainly not points of law.

That Practice Direction is not some arbitrary diktat, but it is there to be obeyed so that the considerable burden of appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal can be expeditiously and fairly dealt with. An appellant who fails to comply with that Practice Direction is, in effect, requiring the judge and the members to spend time on his case, time which could have been avoided, time which would have been unnecessary to be spent had his papers been properly drawn and which could have been spent on other cases.

Not to comply with the Practice Direction is not just a procedural defect, it is a selfish indulgence on the part of the prolix or irrelevant appellant who fails so to comply. It is not, here, as if Mr Dass is illiterate or of low intelligence or can be expected to do no better than to ramble on. This is not such a case. There is no reason why we should think that, if Mr Dass properly disciplines himself, he should not be able to comply properly with the Practice Direction.

So we have told Mr Dass that we decline to hear him today on the 35 pages of material which he had put before us.

We adjourn the matter generally, with liberty to him to amend his Notice of Appeal to include only the points of law relied upon and, when that has been done, then a fresh preliminary hearing can be arranged.

Happily, there is a further circumstance that leads us to think well of such a plan. Mr Dass has today had some help from ELAAS and, it is likely, we think perhaps even probable, that when he and the representative of ELAAS put their heads together, it will be easier to arrive at a proper and concise Notice of Appeal than the case might have been had it been left to Mr Dass alone. In the circumstances of the possible assistance from ELAAS, Mr Dass in fact welcomes our proposal to adjourn the matter in the way that we have indicated.

We should add this: if, when the matter comes back it still transpires that the Practice Direction has not been complied with, then Mr Dass runs the risk that his appeal would be struck out simply for failure to comply with the Practice Direction. It would not be right to strike him out without giving him an opportunity to improve his Notice of Appeal in the way that we have indicated, which is why we adjourn it in the way that we do.

So what we do is adjourn the preliminary hearing appeal generally, with liberty to restore when Mr Dass has considered and has amended his Notice of Appeal so that it complies with the Practice Direction. We give him liberty to amend in that behalf.