United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR B A PENDRY (Partner)
For the Respondent	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against the Registrar's refusal to extend time in which to lodge a Notice of Appeal.

The appeal which Mr Pendry wishes to make on behalf of an organisation called Sugar Ray's Win Bar, is expressed by letter to be against the decisions of Industrial Tribunals given on three different occasions.

Firstly, the decision of the Tribunal dated 17 June 1997 awarding the Applicant, Mr Richmond, the Respondent to this appeal, the sum of £7,050. Secondly, against the Tribunal's refusal to postpone the hearing date of 27 June, which he had requested first on 17 June, and again on 20 June and finally, against the Industrial Tribunal's refusal to supply extended reasons for their decision.

In relation to the third, the refusal of the Industrial Tribunal was on 10 September 1997 and the appeal was received by the EAT on 29 September 1997 and therefore, the appeal against that decision is within time.

The matters in issue relate to the first two parts of the Notice of Appeal. In relation to them they are respectively 56 days out of time and 29 days out of time. The Registrar's order refusing leave was dated 25 November 1997.

I approach this appeal by reference to the guidance set out in United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar [1995] ICR 65, and I must exercise my discretion. The first question to which I direct my attention is, whether I am satisfied that a full and honest explanation has been given for the delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal, and whether that explanation justifies or explains or provides a satisfactory excuse for the delay and thirdly, generally, in the exercise of my discretion, having regard to all relevant factors, would it be just and equitable to extend time.

On the first question it has to be said that I am not satisfied that I have been provided by Mr Pendry with a full and honest explanation of the reasons for the delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal. The chronology is as follows.

The hearing took place on 27 June. On 30 June the Appellant made a request for details of the appeal procedure from the Industrial Tribunal. That was prior to the decision being sent to the parties on 17 July. I accept, therefore, that the Appellant will have received the decision of the Tribunal on 20 July. He tells me that, within a period of one week, namely on 25 July, he went to the Citizens Advice Bureau in Esher to ask about the basis of an appeal. He told me that he was seen by a retired Bank Manager there who said that he knew nothing of the Industrial Tribunal procedure and advised him to approach one of three firms of Solicitors, whose names and telephone numbers were provided.

Faced with what he would regard as unhelpful advice, he therefore went to one of the three Solicitors whom he contacted. It was a female Solicitor who was in a firm in Surbiton. She was discussing with him what rights he had following the Industrial Tribunal decision and he asked me to believe that this Solicitor was unable to tell him what the procedure was for appealing an Industrial Tribunal decision, but that she would have to take Counsel's opinion on that question. I am bound to say that I have great difficulty in believing that that can possibly have been so. He told me that it was on 27 August 1997 that he first became aware of the existence of the Employment Appeal Tribunal as an entity and he was unable to say in what circumstances he came to know of its existence. But he said that immediately he contacted the Employment Appeal Tribunal, who helpfully sent him a Notice of Appeal form and accompanying literature, which made it plain that appeals against Industrial Tribunal decisions would rarely be entertained against written decisions not in extended reason form.

Accordingly, he applied to the Industrial Tribunal on 1 September for extended reasons and I have indicated that their refusal to provide them gives rise to one of the appeals which is within time as to which nothing further needs to be said.

So the question arises as to whether Mr Pendry, who is an FCA, has provided me with any credible explanation for the delay in lodging an appeal against the earlier decisions of the Industrial Tribunal. I have to say, overall, that he has not. He did not receive assistance from the Industrial Tribunal about how he should appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and, not surprisingly therefore, made it his business to consult others who could be expected to know.

It is his case that neither the CAB or a qualified Solicitor was in a position to give him any advice on that question. That would be an astonishing state of affairs, but even if it were right I would have expected Mr Pendry, a professional man, to have immediately sought further advice on the question, since he was aware that if there was a right of appeal which he was sure there must have been, there would be some kind of time limit which would apply to it.

Accordingly, it seems to me that the way he conducted himself between 30 June and 27 August is neither credible. nor if it is credible does it provide a satisfactory or sensible explanation for the delay. I am not persuaded, overall, that any legitimate excuse has been provided to the Employment Appeal Tribunal for the delay in lodging an appeal against the other decisions of the Industrial Tribunals and, in the general exercise of my discretion, it seems to me that the Registrar was correct in the decision she arrived at and that I should dismiss this appeal.

If it transpires that the Employment Appeal Tribunal is satisfied at a preliminary hearing that he has arguable grounds of appeal, then the question as to the future progress of this case will be considered by the Employment Appeal Tribunal at that time. The appeal is dismissed.