United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR A SENDALL (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: Mrs Bath, the Appellant before us, was employed by the Respondent from 19 May 1980 until her dismissal on grounds of ill-health incapability effective on 22 July 1996. She had been continuously unfit for work since 11 January 1995.

Her shop steward, Mr Singh took up her case in July 1996 and entered into negotiations with the Respondent over matters such as pay in lieu of notice and redundancy pay. She did not receive a final settlement cheque until December 1996. However, it was not until 23 January 1997 that she presented a complaint to the Industrial Tribunal alleging unfair dismissal and entitlement to damages for wrongful dismissal and a redundancy payment.

All claims, save for that for unfair dismissal, were withdrawn when the matter came on for a preliminary hearing before a Chairman, Mr I.A. Edwards, sitting alone at the Reading Industrial Tribunal on 13 June 1997.

The sole issue for the Chairman was whether the unfair dismissal claim was time-barred. He found that the complaint was presented just over three months outside the primary three month limitation provided for in Section 111(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. He then went on to consider whether it was not reasonably practicable for the Appellant to present her complaint within time.

He decided that it was reasonably practicable for the Appellant to present the claim within time, bearing in mind that the Appellant was represented by her shop steward from July 1996. He reminded himself that a trade union is a skilled adviser for the purpose of time limits for complaints to an Industrial Tribunal. See Times Newspapers Ltd v O'Regan [1977] IRLR 101. Accordingly, by a decision with Extended Reasons promulgated on 18 June 1997 he dismissed the complaint.

In this appeal Mr Sendall, who appears on behalf of the Appellant under the ELAAS pro bono scheme, submits that the Chairman took too restrictive a view in exercising his discretion under the reasonable practicability escape clause. He submits, on the basis of the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Riley v Tesco Stores Ltd [1980] ICR 323, that it is wrong to stop the enquiry at the stage where a skilled adviser, whether it be a Solicitor or Trade Union or Citizens' Advice Bureau, is involved in the picture and in this connection he further relies on the decision of this Appeal Tribunal in London International College v Sen [1992] IRLR 292. In our judgment the submission itself is too narrowly based.

We are satisfied that the Chairman looked at the matter in the round on the basis of the material that was placed before him and concluded that a delay of more than three months after the expiry of the primary limitation period was, in all the circumstances, such that it could not be said that it was not reasonably practicable for the Appellant to present her complaint within time.

In these circumstances we have come to the conclusion that this appeal raises no arguable point of law and in the circumstances it must be dismissed.