At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
LORD DAVIES OF COITY
MISS A MACKIE OBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | MR M GRIFFITHS (of Counsel) Messrs Osborne Clarke Solicitors Hillgate House 26 Old Bailey London EC4M 7HS |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by the employer, Prudential Assurance Company Ltd (Prudential) against a decision of the Stratford Employment Tribunal, promulgated with extended reasons on 30 June 1998 following a 5 day hearing, that the Respondent employee, Mr Harding, had been unfairly dismissed. The Tribunal went on to find that he had contributed to his dismissal to the extent of 25%.
The Respondent had long and unblemished service with the Prudential, having commenced employment on 2 July 1979. At the relevant time he held the post of training and competency sales manager.
The grounds upon which the Respondent was dismissed on 18 December 1996 related to his conduct. The Prudential relied on the following alleged acts of misconduct; improper alteration of financial services documents relating to clients known as PFR's and forgery of clients' and a fellow employee's signatures. The Respondent admitted two instances of altering PFR's but denied any forgery.
The thrust of the appeal is first that the Tribunal fell into error in substituting its own view for that of the employer. It is, submits Mr Griffiths, the classic case of an Employment Tribunal forming a favourable view of the employee's credibility as a witness before the Tribunal, and relying on that view rather than determining the question, did the employer honestly believe on reasonable grounds after a reasonable investigation that the employee was guilty of the misconduct alleged? In particular, the Tribunal appeared to have proceeded on the basis of their own judgment as to whether in fact the Respondent had forged the signatures of an employee called Woods and a customer named King. Further, it is contended that the Tribunal failed to take into account undisputed facts and made findings unsupported or indeed contrary to the evidence.
These are all matters of law which we consider require full argument at an inter partes hearing. We shall allow the appeal to proceed accordingly. We have considered Mr Griffiths application for the Chaiman's notes of evidence and have concluded at this stage that all that is required is a direction from us that the Chairman be asked to provide his notes of evidence and comments in relation to paragraph 9 of the Notice of Appeal and in particular, the allegations contained in sub-paragraphs (i) and (iv) of paragraph 9.
The case will be listed for 4 hours, Category C. There will be exchange of skeleton arguments between the parties and copies lodged with this Tribunal not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full appeal hearing.
Finally, by letter dated 3 November 1998, the Respondents' solicitors have asked for an extension of time to 42 days for delivery of an Answer. We see from their PHD form that there is no intention to cross appeal and in those circumstances, we regard such an extension as unnecessary. Of course, if so advised, the Respondent may at a later date submit a draft proposed amended Answer prior to the full hearing coupled with an application for leave to amend.