United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: This is a preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mr Laxton against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal which sat in Cardiff on 8th and 9th May 1997.

Mr Laxton had been employed by the Representative Body of the Church in Wales. His job description was that of Provincial Stewardship Officer. He was ultimately dismissed by a notice of 7th June 1996. The dismissal was on grounds of redundancy. He did exercise rights of internal appeal, but they were unsuccessful.

He applied to the Industrial Tribunal alleging unfair dismissal. In his IT1 he said:

"I maintain that I have been dismissed unfairly, a circumstances due entirely to the discriminatory and prejudiced behaviour of my ex-employer."

It is apparent from the terms of the extended reasons given by the Industrial Tribunal that an allegation of discrimination, prejudice and disingenuousness lay at the heart of Mr Laxton's case before the Industrial Tribunal.

The situation had been that Mr Laxton began work in 1990, but that in or about early 1996 his superiors had begun to express concern about his performance of his duties. Indeed, Mr Laxton appears to have accepted some of the criticisms, but by no means all of them. In relation to this, some disciplinary steps were being taken in February 1996, and sometime after that, Mr Laxton went on sick leave.

Whilst all that had been taking place, the employers had been considering the future of the post of Provincial Stewardship Officer and had been, or were beginning, to contemplate some element of reorganisation.

On 3rd May 1996, whilst Mr Laxton was still on sick leave, he was written to by his employers with an invitation to a meeting to discuss his future employment. It was emphasised that that was not to be a disciplinary meeting. Mr Laxton was not able to attend immediately, but was able to attend and did so on 20th May 1996.

At the meeting on that occasion the issues were explained to Mr Laxton. He was told that his employers saw the role of his position as having disappeared, he was also told that he would be able to apply, along with other applicants, for a new type of job that was then under contemplation.

It seems that after that meeting Mr Laxton was invited to add to his oral representations by submitting something in writing. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal contains the following passage:

"11. The decision to dismiss the applicant was made on the 28th and prior to that Mr Laxton had taken the opportunity which was offered to him to put into writing those views that he had about the matters that had been discussed in the meeting of 20 May for consideration by the respondent before a final decision was made to terminate."

After receipt of those written observations, the employers made the decision to dismiss on 28th May and Mr Laxton was dismissed with notice in writing on 7th June 1996.

The case which Mr Laxton advanced to the Industrial Tribunal was very strongly coloured by his allegations of bad faith. His case is summarised by the Industrial Tribunal as follows:

"15. The applicant challenges the redundancy situation and feels aggrieved because he feels that his dismissal was engineered in bad faith by [his line manager] who was dissatisfied with his performance. The resulting Redundancy procedure was a sham designed to mask the reality of the situation which is indicated by his lack of warning and consultation and by his failure to obtain the alternative job which he regarded as essentially identical and one which was deservedly his."

The essence of the Industrial Tribunal's finding is that they totally rejected the allegation of bad faith, bias and sham, being the issues with which they were primarily concerned. They dismissed a possible connection between the ongoing disciplinary matters and the eventual redundancy; that is apparent from paragraph 16(a) of their decision. They did state in the course of the decision that Mr Laxton had been aware before 20th May of the potential redundancy and they gave a reason for that finding. Mr Laxton says that that was an error of fact and an inappropriate interpretation of some documents that were before the Industrial Tribunal.

As we have indicated, the substantial issue was the one of bias and sham, and upon that Mr Laxton simply lost his case. He has accepted before us that he is not entitled to re-open factual matters of that kind, and must seek to develop one or more points of law which may be arguable. Accordingly, he has limited his submissions, effectively, to the issue of consultation and whether or not his dismissal was fair in the light of the consultation which took place.

Accepting from Mr Laxton that he did not know of a likely redundancy before 20th May 1996, the question therefore is whether the Industrial Tribunal's findings about the 20th May 1996 and the subsequent period evidence any error of law which might find expression in this Appeal Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal said this:

"18. As much time as possible is desirable in the question of the consultation period but in this case sufficient time was made available for the necessary representation, that is the important matter ... The tribunal are also satisfied that the applicant had ample warning of the position in relation to his job."

The tribunal then went on to repeat its rejection of the allegation of bad faith and bias.

The issue once it is encapsulated as a point of law has to be reducible to an arguable proposition that no Industrial Tribunal could have found that there was adequate and fair consultation in this case.

In our unanimous judgment, it is not possible to mount a credible argument to that effect. It may be that one Industrial Tribunal would view the matter differently from another. That is sometimes the case. For Mr Laxton to succeed, he would have to have an arguable case that no reasonable Industrial Tribunal could have found adequate and fair consultation. In our judgment, he has no realistic prospect of establishing that in the circumstances of this case, anymore than he would have had any prospect of challenging the tribunal's findings upon bias and bad faith.

Accordingly, we have come to the unanimous conclusion that there is no future in this appeal, and it is hereby dismissed.