At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MRS R CHAPMAN
MR R SANDERSON OBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE
For the Appellant | MR J GALBRAITH-MARTEN (Counsel) ELAAS |
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing was to determine whether Mr Munde had an arguable point of law in an appeal against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Bury St Edmunds on 7th February 1997. By that decision the Industrial Tribunal Chairman sitting alone awarded him the sum of £21.82 by way of breach of contract against his former employers, Cambridge Consulting Engineers.
The only ground of appeal relates to a claim, which in our view, was obviously made in the IT1, that is the claim set out at paragraph 2 of the grounds of application coupled with paragraph 10. In effect, what is being said by Mr Munde in his IT1 was that he was entitled to the benefit of a disciplinary procedure before being dismissed by his employers, and accordingly, he is entitled to be compensated for the breach of that procedure which would be based on the length of time that it would take for that procedure to have been complied with before he was dismissed.
The Industrial Tribunal dealt with his claim and rejected it in paragraph 2 of the decision. It would appear likely that they have misdirected themselves as to the proper approach having regard to the decisions in Gunton v The London Borough of Richmond [1980] ICR 755 and Boyo v Lambeth Borough Council [1994] ICR 727.
It seems to us that the following four issues would arise for determination by the Industrial Tribunal before they could dismiss his claim that I have identified. First, was the disciplinary procedure a contractual entitlement; second, if yes, did it apply in the circumstances of this case; third, if yes, was it followed; and fourth, if no, did Mr Munde suffer any, and if so, what loss, bearing in mind that he limits his claim to seven days pay.
Because of the very small amount involved in this case, we can indicate in this judgment in the absence of the respondents, that if having considered what we have said, they were of the view that the most convenient course would be to avoid a further hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, we would be prepared to consider a written representation from them if they felt it appropriate that the appeal should be allowed to the extent that I have indicated and that the matter be remitted to an Industrial Tribunal if needs be for determination. That would save a hearing before us. If they were of the view that there was merit in the complaint being made by Mr Munde, then no doubt they will consider whether it would be appropriate to dispose of the case in some other way.
If the matter has to come back before this Court, then it will be a case which will take quarter of an hour to argue in our view. It should be listed as a Category C case fit for hearing before any of the judges.