At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR E HAMMOND OBE
MRS R A VICKERS
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | IN PERSON |
For the Respondents | NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: It seems, from the Originating Applications lodged by Dr King, that she was employed by the Respondent from 12 December 1988 until her dismissal on 5 March 1997.
Following her dismissal she has lodged no less than 10 forms IT1, alleging breach of contract; unfair dismissal; exercise of grievance right; right to written reasons for dismissal; and a claim for a statement of terms and conditions of employment following variation. One of those applications has been withdrawn.
We have before us a schedule of those forms IT1. They appear to have been registered under three separate numbers, with the exception of two applications which were not registered, pending further particulars being provided by the Appellant. What is clear is that each claim has been brought within the statutory time limit.
Given the somewhat unusual circumstances of these myriad applications by a single Applicant against a single Respondent, an Industrial Tribunal Chairman at Stratford, where the claims are progressing, has ordered by letter dated 21 May that a directions hearing should take place on 30 July so that the following matters may be canvassed and directions given;
"(i) Whether cases should be consolidated or heard together?
(ii) What Orders for particulars or discovery, if any, should be made?
(iii) What Witness Orders, if any, should be made?
(iv) What further directions, if any, are required?
(v) How long the case is likely to last and give directions as to the date and length of the hearing."
Prior to that hearing taking place the Appellant has appealed to this Tribunal, complaining that the Industrial Tribunal has pre-empted the question of consolidation by allocating only three numbers to the Originating Applications still extant, and treating certain Originating Applications as amendments to an earlier application, the substance of which was withdrawn. She contends that the way in which her claims have been treated indicates bias on the part of the Industrial Tribunal, as well as a failure to comply with the Industrial Tribunal Rules of Procedure. She asks that the cases be transferred to a different Industrial Tribunal.
As to the Tribunal's breaches of the Rules of Procedure she makes the following points:
(1) Each Originating Application must, under Rule 2, be registered, and each given a number.
(2) The Industrial Tribunal has treated four of her applications as an amendment to an earlier Originating Application which she has withdrawn, without reference to her.
(3) The Industrial Tribunal has pre-empted the question of consolidation under Rule 18.
(4) The Industrial Tribunal has refused to register two Originating Applications pending further particulars being supplied. Those particulars, she says were supplied under cover of her letter dated 15 May 1997 but still they have not been registered.
We should say at once that our powers to interfere with Interlocutory Orders of Industrial Tribunals are limited to correcting errors of law. We do not have a general power of review.
If we identify an error of law, we may either exercise the powers of an Industrial Tribunal ourselves, or remit the matter to an Industrial Tribunal for a hearing.
We are not satisfied that the Tribunal has fallen into error. However, even assuming that it has, the correct course in our judgment, would be to remit the cases for a full direction's hearing. That has already been arranged for 30 July. That hearing should take place at Stratford. We can see no bias or appearance of bias on the part of the Industrial Tribunal thus far. What we think has happened is that the position may have been confused by the number of Originating Applications lodged and the correspondence which has followed. For example, in a letter dated 7 July from the Industrial Tribunal to the Appellant, the Tribunal appears to have overlooked her letter of 15 May which contains particulars of the two Originating Applications not as yet, so we understand it, registered.
At the directions hearing the Industrial Tribunal will:
(1) Identify the causes of action raised by the Appellant, and the issues to be determined.
(2) If the Originating Applications are to be consolidated and that would be a matter for argument and determination by the Industrial Tribunal, it may be that the Appellant will be required to give particulars of each complaint in a composite document, to which the Respondent will similarly respond in writing.
(3) Applications for discovery will be considered and adjudicated upon. We anticipate that further discovery application may be made by either party once the parties' cases are properly and fully pleaded.
(4) No question of limitation appears to arise.
(5) Questions of witness summons will be considered.
(6) Time estimates will be received from the parties with a view to giving a listing direction.
(7) Any further directions raised by the parties or by the Tribunal of its own motion will be considered.
We should add this. Having listened to Dr King it seems to us that her principal concern is that she will be prevented from raising certain causes of action. We believe that fear is misconceived. Industrial Tribunals are well used to considering different heads of claim at one hearing. They must be astute to identify the different issues arising, for example, in a statutory claim for unfair dismissal and a common-law claim for wrongful dismissal. That is why it is essential that the issues are clearly defined on paper before the substantive hearing or hearings commence.
In dismissing this appeal we hope that our observations as to the future likely conduct of these cases may be of assistance to the parties and to the Industrial Tribunal.