United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS


 


JUDGE B HARGROVE QC: After a hearing on 3 March 1997 the Industrial Tribunal held the Respondent to be unfairly dismissed. She had been a part-time worker and as the Industrial Tribunal found, entitled to two days' work a week.

The Respondent failed to provide work after 3 January 1996, pleading that there had been a down-turn in business but saying that part-time staff might be needed in the future. The Industrial Tribunal found that there was a contract of employment and that the letter which set out the matters to which we have referred constituted a dismissal. The Respondent had asked to be made redundant. The Industrial Tribunal found that that was not the reason for the dismissal but, in the alternative, if the reason was redundancy, then the manner in which she was selected for redundancy was unfair.

The Appellant decided not to appear before us and relied upon the documents. The Appellant's first point is that the Respondent was named upon the IT1 as "John Williams". However, the whole of the IT1 shows clearly that the Respondent was saying that the employment was with the Appellant and the case was conducted on that basis. There is no indication that this point was taken before the Industrial Tribunal. Mr Williams, the Managing Director and Chairman, conducted the case and it is now too late to take the point, having led the Respondent into the position where she reasonably concluded that the Appellants were accepting that they stood in the position of employing her. Moreover, the IT3 asserts that the Appellant was the employer and that was accompanied by a letter from Mr Williams, which described him as Chairman and Managing Director.

Secondly, it is said that Mr Williams was refused permission to cross-examine the Respondent. What happened was that Miss Williams conducted the case on behalf of the Appellant. After she cross-examined Mrs Ramsey, Mr Williams wanted to cross-examine her as well but the Chairman stopped him. In this the Chairman acted properly. Once the privilege of cross-examination has been exercised by one person on behalf of a litigant, it is unjust to allow others to do so as well. There is nothing in that point raised by the Appellant.

Thirdly, the Appellant says that there was a break in continuity of employment for a fortnight in November 1995 and, therefore, there was not the required two years' continuous employment. It is clear that this point was raised only by the Appellant in the letter of 10 March to the Industrial Tribunal a week after the hearing. That letter refers to a closer examination of the time-sheets. In other words, if examination of the time-sheets is being carried out with reasonable diligence, the matter could have been before the Tribunal. The rule in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745 precludes a consideration on appeal of matters which could have been discovered and placed before the lower tribunal with reasonable diligence.

Finally, the skeleton argument raises the point that Mr Williams has paid the award. That matter does not appear in the notice of appeal. Even if it did, it is not a matter which concerns an appeal Court.

There is nothing in any of the points raised, there is no reasonably arguable point of law and the appeal is dismissed.