United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT WAS NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED
For the Respondents	THE RESPONDENTS WERE NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED


 


JUDGE LEVY QC: This is an interlocutory appeal by Mrs M Griffiths in a complaint she has made against Great North Eastern Railways. Her complaint was received by the Industrial Tribunal on 20th December 1996, and the respondent entered a Notice of Appearance dated 10th February 1997. A decision of the Industrial Tribunal was made on 25th April 1997 in response to a request by Mrs Griffiths requesting inspection of documents.

The Chairman refused the request for documents on two grounds which are set out in his letter dated 25th April 1997:

"1. In general that, having regard to the fact that Industrial Tribunals are intended to deal with matters, so far as possible, speedily, simply and cheaply, the general policy is to seek to avoid making interlocutory orders, such as orders for discovery, save in so far as "they appear to be genuinely necessary in order to do justice between the parties" - see remarks of Mr Justice Phillips in the unreported Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in the case of Stone v Charrington (15.2.77). This latter phrase being approved in the case of Science Research Council v Nasse 1979 ICR 921.

2. The Chairman has considered the contents of the Originating Application, the Notice of Appearance, the reply, dated 16 April 1997, by the respondents' solicitors to your original request for such discovery and your reply, date 21 April to that letter. The Chairman has accepted the contentions of the respondents' solicitors. He considers that such an order does not appear genuinely necessary to do justice between the parties. Further that, in any event, such an order would be of uncertain effect and would be unduly burdensome."

From that interlocutory order Mrs Griffiths wrote to the Employment Appeal tribunal on 16th May 1997 to launch an appeal against it. She says in her letter that the documents requested are essential to the pursuance of her case. She says that she is aware of the provision of the documents will incur costs, but she feels strongly that without them she will be at a serious disadvantage in any hearing where the solicitors acting for the respondents have them and she has to rely on oral evidence. As the solicitors have already said that they have the papers, she cannot see why their release to her would present a problem. She enclose certain documents as well as a reply sent to the Chairman. She asked for the Chairman's decision to be reversed.

The solicitor for the respondents is Messrs Vizards ["Vizards"]. Vizards sent to the Industrial Tribunal at letter dated 16th April 1997. In it they responded in some detail to the categories of documents of which Mrs Griffiths has sought discovery, and in the paragraph numbered one stated that they had offered the appellant access to her personal file at any time by mutually convenient prior appointment. She does not appear to have taken advantage of this offer. In the letter solid grounds set out why, on the respondent's' behalf Vizards felt unable or unwilling to comply with the various requests.

Having looked at all the correspondence, we cannot see that the discretion exercise by the Chairman in his decision of 25th April 1997 is in any way wrong. As was said by Phillips J in the authority to which the Chairman referred, there should not be disclosure unless "the discovery sought appears to be genuinely necessary in order to do justice between the parties". In our judgment, this is not the case here.

Mrs Griffiths, we feel sure, will have every assistance from the respondents and from the Industrial Tribunal if she has not an opportunity in advance of giving evidence or questioning witnesses. to inspect documents which are really relevant to the hearing if and when they are mentioned at the hearing; having regard to the sensible communication from Vizards, if she takes the opportunity offered to her to inspect the documents which are offered, we suspect that there will be little delay caused by that. In the circumstances we dismiss this appeal.