United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR GOULDING (of Counsel) The Solicitor South Wales Police Police Headquarters Cowbridge Road Bridgend CF31 3SU


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: This appeal comes before us on a Preliminary Hearing in the following circumstances.

On 3 January 1996 the Appellant invited applications from chief inspectors, inspectors and others for places on a police management programme at Bramshill College.

The Respondents, all serving police officers in the Appellant's force, applied for places. On 26 March 1996 their applications were rejected.

In April 1996 the programme commenced. The final course in that programme took place between 10 - 21 March 1997.

On 6 January 1997 the Respondents presented Originating Applications to the Industrial Tribunal alleging unlawful discrimination on grounds of their race and/or sex. The nature of the complaints was that the Respondents had been excluded from the course as a result of a positive action policy by South Wales Police, which involved allocating places on the programme to women and those from the ethnic minorities.

The Appellant took a limitation point. It was said that the act complained of for the purposes of Section 68(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 and Section 76(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, was the single act of rejection which took place on 26 March 1996. Accordingly the complaints were made outside the three month primary limitation period.

That preliminary issue came before a Chairman, Dr Rachel Davies, sitting alone at the Cardiff Industrial Tribunal on 25 February 1997. She held that there was here a continuous course of conduct on the part of the Appellant which did not end until 21 March 1997, when the final Bramshill course was completed. Accordingly the complaint was within time.

Alternatively, she held that if the effective date on which time began to run was 26 March 1996, she would exercise her discretion in favour of the Respondents under Section 68(6) of the 1976 Act and Section 76(5) of the 1975 Act and extend time on the ground that the ongoing nature of the training from which the Respondents were apparently excluded rendered it just and equitable to do so.

In this appeal Mr Goulding challenges both findings. He submits that the act complained of was the rejection of the Respondents' applications on 26 March 1996, not a continuous act for the purposes of Section 68(7)(b) of the 1976 Act and its equivalent in the 1975 Act. He relies upon the distinction between a continuing act and a single act which has continuing consequences, identified in Sougrin v Haringey Health Authority [1992] IRLR 416. In this connection reference may also be made to Cast v Croydon College [1997] IRLR 14. Conversely, reference may also be made to Owusu v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority [1995] IRLR 574.

As to the alternative basis for the Chairman's finding, the just and equitable extension of time, it is well-settled that this question is essentially one of fact for the Industrial Tribunal, which has a wide discretion: see Hutchison v Westward Television Ltd [1977] ICR 279, applied in Hawkins v Ball & Barclays Bank Plc [1996] IRLR 258. However, what is said here is that the sole ground for extending time is an irrelevant or impermissible factor. The finding is perverse.

In our view both points raised in this appeal are arguable and should go forward to a full appeal hearing. The time estimate for that hearing is half a day. Skeleton arguments should be exchanged between the parties and copies lodged with the EAT not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full appeal hearing.