At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
DR D GRIEVES CBE
MR R JACKSON
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | IN PERSON |
JUDGE D M LEVY QC: We have before us a proposed appeal by Mr William John Cannie. He complains that he was unfairly made redundant, unfairly dismissed, and no reasons were given for his dismissal by the Bolton Training Group Ltd by whom he was employed. The date of his dismissal was 30 October 1995. His application to the Industrial Tribunal on which he wanted to mount a claim was received by the Tribunal on 30 January 1996.
The point was taken by his employers that the application was received out of time. There was an initial hearing by an Industrial Tribunal, which he did not attend, where the employer's point was accepted. There was an application to review that decision on grounds that letters giving Mr Cannie the dates of the hearing did not reach him.
The majority of the Tribunal thought it appropriate that there should be a further hearing and there was such a further hearing. At that re-hearing the Industrial Tribunal unanimously decided that the application was made out of time, despite the fact that it was reasonably practicable for the Originating Application to be presented within the period provided by the Employment Right Act 1996, sections 93(3) and 111(2). The Tribunal gave the reasons for their decision which was sent to the parties on 27 November 1996.
The submissions of the Applicant are set out in the Extended Reasons and indeed, we noticed that the Applicant drew the attention of the Tribunal to the case of Marley (UK) Limited & Another v Anderson [1996] ICR 728 in support of his argument as to the late discovery of relevant facts and evidence.
Paragraph 17 reads as follows:
"17. The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that the relevant facts were known to the Applicant from the outset of the three months period, and although he contended that the evidence to support it was only discovered late within that period, it was clear that the Originating Application had been prepared and signed at the latest by the 26th January 1996, i.e. three days before the time limit expired. The Originating Application could have been sent by facsimile transmission on that date and, therefore, the Tribunal concluded that it must have been reasonably practicable for the Originating Application to have been presented within the three months time limit."
Paragraph 18 reads:
"18. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that both complaints had been presented out of time and the Originating Application should be dismissed."
Against that decision Mr Cannie wishes to appeal by Notice dated 6 January 1997. We have heard his submissions, but really what he is asking us to do is to say that the Tribunal below wrongly exercised its discretion in refusing to extend time.
We have set out the relevant paragraph in the unanimous decision. The conclusion reached is one which, on the facts, the Tribunal was entitled to reach. It is not an exercise of their discretion with which we can interfere. Mr Cannie has suggested that there was some sort of bias by the Tribunal in the manner in which his hearing was heard. That has not been supported by any affidavit evidence. He has not presented that before us with any great vigour this morning. We are satisfied, from what he has told us, that there was a fair hearing below and there is no point in this appeal going further.
We therefore dismiss it at this stage.