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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Tiptoes Theatre Dance Fitness Studio (A Firm) v Barnes [1997] UKEAT 522_97_2710 (27 October 1997)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/522_97_2710.html
Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 522_97_2710
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| At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE H J BYRT QC
DR D GRIEVES CBE
MR R SANDERSON OBE
TIPTOES THEATRE DANCE FITNESS STUDIO (A FIRM) APPELLANT
MISS J BARNES RESPONDENT
| APPELLANT | |
| RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
| For the Appellants | NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS |
JUDGE JOHN BYRT QC: This is a preliminary hearing in an appeal against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal Chairman sitting alone in Manchester. The decision was promulgated on 15 March 1997 and it held that Miss Barnes, the Applicant in the case, was an employed person and was entitled to two weeks' holiday pay covering the period of Christmas of 1996.
The Respondents did not attend the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal Chairman but completed an IT3 in which they claimed that the Applicant was self-employed. The Industrial Tribunal Chairman accepted the Applicant's evidence that she was, in fact, employed by the Respondents between November 1995 and January 1997 and, in consequence, was entitled to be remunerated over the Christmas period for the two weeks' holiday at the weekly rate of her pay, which was £220 per week. In those circumstances, the Tribunal Chairman found that the Respondents owed the Applicant the sum of £440.
We have information contained in a letter dated 10 June 1997 that the Respondents, who have appealed that decision and are, therefore, now the Appellants has ceased trading and they did not intend to attend before this Tribunal. We have considered the basis upon which they sought to appeal and have concluded that there is no arguable point of law raised by that ground of appeal and, accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.