United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing has been to determine whether Mr Eshak has any arguable point of law in relations to appeals which he wishes to make against two decisions of an Industrial Tribunal.

The first decision is in relation to a hearing held on 16 September 1994, in respect of his complaint which he had made against his former employers, Pinkerton Security Services. The decision is in this form:

"The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the parties having agreed to settle this claim on the terms set out in writing and lodged with the Tribunal it is ordered that all further proceedings on the claim be adjourned generally under further order."

That decision was sent to the parties on 4 October 1994. The Notice of Appeal in this case is dated May 1995. There is therefore, technically a time limit point in relation to the appeal against this decision, but in the circumstances we are happy to deal with this appeal on the basis that his Notice of Appeal had been put in within time.

The second decision against which there is an appeal (and the Notice of Appeal was within time in relation to this) was that of an Industrial Tribunal held at London (North) on 28 March 1995. That decision was sent to the parties on 5 April 1995. By their decision they concluded that they had no jurisdiction to hear the claims that Mr Eshak was bringing against Mr Godsave and Mrs Kamara.

The reason why they arrived at that decision was essentially because they were satisfied that they had no jurisdiction to hear that complaint as neither of the Respondents had discriminated against the Applicant in the course of his employment. Neither of them was his employer and he had no extant claim against his employer to which these proceedings could be added. Mr Eshak in addition to that also presented complaints against Beresford & Co, which proceedings I think have also been dismissed. We are satisfied that there is no arguable point of law in relation to the prospective appeals for the reasons which I will shortly summarise.

The background facts are that Mr Eshak was employed by Pinkerton Security Services, and had been so employed for some time. He was assigned to duties at premises which were owned and managed by a company called Beresford & Co. At those premises the cleaning services were provided to Beresfords by a company called Endesham Ltd of whom Mr Godsave was the Manager and Mrs Y. Kamara was one of the cleaning employees.

There was an allegation made in relation to Mr Eshack's performance of his duties at those premises, and, following that alleged incident, Pinkerton Security Services took Mr Eshack off working at those premises and thereafter employed him elsewhere. Mr Eshack believed that he had been dealt with unfairly and unlawfully by Pinkerton Security Services because he was firmly of the view that any complaint by Mrs Kamara had no substance to it at all and was, in fact, a malicious complaint which had been improperly made against him. His proceedings against Pinkerton Security Services were commenced by an Industrial Tribunal application which was presented on 15 March 1994. He presented a further complaint against Mr Godsave and Mrs Kamara on 22 April 1994 and he presented a third complaint against Beresfords on 14 November 1994.

In their IT3, Pinkertons effectively said that Mr Eshak had the right to appeal against the decision which had been made in his case and that if he cared to exercise his right of appeal, they would entertain it despite the fact that it had been made out of time. He exercised his right of appeal. It was duly heard and, as we understand it, such an appeal was successful. However, on 16 September 1994, as we have indicated, Mr Eshak appeared before the Industrial Tribunal in relation to his complaint against Pinkerton.

Having given evidence to the Industrial Tribunal the Chairman indicated that it might be sensible if the parties were able to arrive at an accommodation. There were four people from Pinkertons and I wish to stress that Mr Eshak was entirely on his own. He was unrepresented and was therefore entirely looking after his own interests.

During the course of discussions which took place between the parties, in due time an agreement in writing was signed first of all on behalf of Pinkerton and secondly, by Mr Eshak. The agreement, which comprises two pages, both of which were signed by both parties, records a confirmation that Pinkertons recognised that he was not removed from the Beresford site as a result of any disciplinary action. In other words, as we read that paragraph, this was a formula for indicating that Pinkertons were not continuing to allege, if they had ever alleged, that Mr Eshak had been guilty of any impropriety whatever. In addition, they agreed to upgrade him in terms of pay from the current grade that he was receiving to £3.35 per hour. The agreement recorded that:

"This agreement deals with all outstanding grievances and disputes between the parties. Applicant agrees to withdraw his application on the basis of the conditions above which are agreed by both parties."

After that document had been signed there was a discussion, in the course of which the Chairman indicated that he would be making a settlement order. Mr Eshak told us that he understood the Chairman to be indicating that an order would be made which would give him some compensation which he felt he was entitled to following the way he had been dealt with. He told us that he had not told the Industrial Tribunal what sum he could expect, that his employers had not told the Tribunal what sum they thought could be awarded, if any, but nonetheless he was still of the view that because the Chairman was going to make a "settlement order" there was some money going to come to him.

We are quite satisfied that Mr Eshak completely misunderstood what was being said. We do not criticise him for that, but it seems to us that he has signed a settlement agreement which purported to deal with all outstanding grievances and disputes between the parties, and the settlement order which was made by the Tribunal was the standard form order made in cases such as this.

It seems to us that it is not open to Mr Eshak to seek to go behind the agreement which was made between the parties, even though he was outnumbered in the course of the negotiations. He is a person who we are confident understood what was going on, in terms of understanding the language which was used in the settlement agreement and, as it seems to us, it is difficult for him in those circumstances genuinely to contend that he believed that there was an outstanding grievance or dispute between the parties, namely the question of compensation which he thought the Tribunal was then going to award him in due course.

Accordingly, it seems to us that there no grounds for suggesting that this decision of the Industrial Tribunal was wrong in law in any respect. It was a decision which was made following a settlement agreement freely entered into between the parties. That, having been done, it then became necessary for the Industrial Tribunal to look at the other complaints which were made, which arose out of the same facts. They did so in their second decision, in which they concluded that they had no jurisdiction. We have to say that, as a matter of law, it seems to us the Industrial Tribunal was entirely right in its view that it had no jurisdiction to deal with these complaints, as they did not involve a complaint against his employer. The Industrial Tribunals jurisdiction is limited to dealing with acts of discrimination in the work place and in the employment context and accordingly, we are satisfied that there is no point of law which is arguable in relation to the other Tribunal decisions.

Mr Eshak points out, and we wish to put on record, that he has subsequently been constructively, as he says, dismissed by Pinkerton and it may be that there are other proceedings of which we are unaware to which this judgment has no application. We are considering only the applications to which I have previously referred in this judgment.