United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: This is a preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mr Coran against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal which sat at London (North) on 11th February 1997.

Miss Antonee was claiming sex discrimination. She had originally proceeded against her employer, Nonfield Ltd, formerly known as Fletcher Hunt Plc. Subsequently, the Industrial Tribunal ordered Mr Coran to be joined as second respondent. The dates are of some significance. The Originating Application to the Industrial Tribunal had been made on 22nd March 1994 when only the company was a respondent. It was not until 5th January 1996 that the tribunal ordered Mr Coran to be added as second respondent. He submitted his Notice of Appearance on 8th February 1996 seeking to resist the applicant's complaint. It is significant that he did not at any stage seek to appeal the interlocutory decision that caused him to be added as a defendant.

The hearing in the Industrial Tribunal went ahead, although the first respondent was by then within the jurisdiction of the High Court Chancery Division by reason of insolvency, but the High Court had given leave for the applicant to proceed. The company appears to have taken no part in the proceedings; perhaps more surprisingly, Mr Coran took no part in the proceedings. He wrote to the Industrial Tribunal shortly before the hearing asking the tribunal to take into account some documents, but he absented himself from the hearing. Miss Antonee gave evidence on her own behalf. She called a witness. The tribunal found both of them to be honest and credible.

The findings of fact do not require repetition by us, save to say, that the Industrial Tribunal was entirely satisfied that Mr Coran had been sexually harassing Miss Antonee for a period of time in a thoroughly reprehensible and humiliating way. It found the claim of discrimination and victimisation to be proved. It awarded Miss Antonee £10,000 for injured feelings. It also ordered the employer to pay £10,000 in respect of loss of earnings.

The Notice of Appeal is put forward by Mr Coran alone. In it he seeks to question the decision whereby he was joined in the proceedings. He asserts that the Industrial Tribunal failed to consider the hardship that would be occasioned to him by such joinder. He further alleges that the Industrial Tribunal which eventually heard the substantive claim failed to consider whether it had jurisdiction in relation to him because of the statutory time limit. It criticises the Industrial Tribunal for failure to consider documentation that he had sent to the Industrial Tribunal; and it claims that the award of £10,000 was perverse and contrary to principle. It finally seeks a copy of the Chairman's notes.

It seems to us that the decision to join Mr Coran was not challenged as and when it could have been, although we are bound to say that if it had been challenged by interlocutory appeal we can see nothing on the face of the papers to suggest that such a challenge would have succeeded.

The point about hardship is risible. It states that the appellant was prejudiced by the passage of time in obtaining witness statements to corroborate his account. As he deliberately refrained from giving any evidence to the tribunal himself, that would appear to us to be a transparent nonsense.

The point about the time limit is misconceived since proceedings were already in being and it is well-established that in those circumstances, provided that the Industrial Tribunal is satisfied under the rules, a joinder can take place at the time this one did.

The only ground of appeal which deserves any consideration at all, is the one directed to the size of the award for loss of feelings, namely £10,000. It is well-known that this appeal tribunal does not substitute its own view of an award for that of an Industrial Tribunal provided that the Industrial Tribunal has acted within acceptable parameters, and provided also that there is no reason to suppose it has misunderstood the evidence or misapplied the law.

It seems to us in that considering the broad bracket of awards for injury to feelings in sex discrimination cases, given the facts of the case, this award of £10,000 might be considered to come towards the higher end of the bracket. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that it is within the bracket, and that being the case, it is not susceptible to challenge in this appeal tribunal.

In all the circumstances, therefore, there are no arguable grounds of appeal put forward on behalf of Mr Coran. There would be no point served in permitting his appeal to go to a final hearing, and it is hereby dismissed.