At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR D A C LAMBERT
MRS J C RUBIN
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
INTERLOCUTORY
JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by the applicant, Mr Edwards in a case currently proceeding before the London (North) Industrial Tribunal against a decision of a Chairman of that tribunal, Mr Andrew Bano refusing to postpone the hearing of the appellant's complaint which is fixed for tomorrow, 18th March 1997.
The procedural background is as follows. On 30th September 1996 the appellant presented a complaint to the Industrial Tribunal under the Wages Act and also complained of unfair dismissal against his former employers Stakis Casinos Ltd. The employer entered a Notice of Appearance on 22nd October 1996 resisting the claims.
On 3rd December 1996 the tribunal issued a Notice of Hearing to take place on 20th January 1997. On 6th December 1996, the respondent applied for a postponement of that hearing date. That application was granted on 14th December 1996, and a new hearing date was given to the parties, that is on 17th February 1997.
On 15th January 1997, the appellant applied for a postponement of 17th February 1997 date, that application was granted on 21st January 1997. On 12th February 1997 the hearing was re-fixed for 18th March 1997. On 26th February 1997 the appellant applied for a postponement of that date on the grounds that he had a custody matter involving his daughter to attend to. That application was refused.
On 12th March 1997 he made a further application for postponement on the grounds that his representative would be abroad on the date of hearing. That application was also refused by Mr Bano.
Now he appeals against that refusal.
Industrial Tribunals have a wide discretion to allow or refuse applications for a postponement under Rule 13(7) of the Industrial Tribunal Rules of Procedure 1993. The width of that discretion has been clearly set out by the Court of Appeal in Carter v Credit Change Ltd [1979] ICR 908. Bearing in mind the guidance given in that case and earlier Employment Appeal Tribunal decisions there referred to, we can see no grounds for interfering with the exercise of the Chairman's discretion in this instance.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.