United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
For the Respondent	MS EMMA WHITE (of Counsel) Messrs Nash Solicitors Beaumont House Beaumont Park Plymouth Devon PL4 9BD


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): At an Industrial Tribunal held at Exeter on 11th November 1996, the applicant, Mr Hill, was adjudged to have been unfairly dismissed and in consequence the employers, the appellants, were ordered to pay him compensation in the sum of £2,040.00 made up as set out in the summary reasons given at that time.

The employer then appealed to this Court by a Notice of Appeal dated 24th December 1996. At that stage it was an appeal against the decision expressed in summary reasons only, although he had applied to the tribunal for extended reasons, after the expiration of the time limited for making such an application.

It is apparent from the Notice of Appeal that was filed that there was no point of law being contended for.

Subsequently, the Industrial Tribunal, in order to assist this Court, provided extended reasons for their decision.

On about 25th March 1997, the appellant informed the employee's legal representatives, the respondent to the appeal, that the appeal was being withdrawn. At that time the employers then paid the principal sum which was due and owing to the employee, but did not pay the interest.

The issue that arises before us today is whether the respondent to the appeal, the former employee, is entitled to have his costs paid by the appellants on the grounds that there has been unreasonable conduct in bringing and conducting this appeal.

It is submitted to us, we think cogently, that the Notice of Appeal did not reveal any point of law; it was a hopeless appeal which should never have been advanced in the first place. It is to be noted that the employers had the benefit of representation at the Industrial Tribunal. Presumably, therefore, the employers were in a position to be advised as to the limits of this Court's jurisdiction, which is to deal with points of law only; and yet persisted in running an appeal, no doubt the principal purpose of which was to defer the moment at which payment had to be made to the former successful employee.

Having looked at the submission which we received by the employer, explaining why it was that this appeal was being withdrawn, we are satisfied that the employers have been guilty of unreasonable conduct in presenting and conducting this appeal. It is apparent from the submission made on behalf of the appellants that they simply did not understand the jurisdiction of this Court. There is ample literature available at Industrial Tribunals and elsewhere which fully explains the way in which this Court operates and that its jurisdiction is confined to correcting errors of law only. Our procedure has been abused by these proceedings, and it seems to us, therefore, that in the exercise of our discretion, we can properly order that costs should be paid.

We have been invited to make a determination as to the amount of the costs. Where the amount is substantial, as in this case, this Court will be slow assess the costs itself if there is some realistic prospect that on a taxation the amount being sought will be reduced by the Taxing Officer. This Court should not use its power to fix costs so as to deprive the other party of the benefit of a taxation in cases where that would seem to be appropriate. But in this case we have had the benefit of a very detailed bill of costs drawn up by the solicitors in this case, and we have been through it with some considerable care. It seems to us in the circumstances of this case, that it would be appropriate for us to fix the amount of costs. That is what we were invited to do and we accede to that suggestion.

The total sum being claimed seems to us not to be exorbitant or excessive in any respect. It amounts to just over £1,300 inclusive of VAT. Having regard to the possibility that there might be the odd item which might be reduced, we consider that when fixing the costs we should make a small discount from that figure, and award a round sum. We accordingly award the sum of £1,200 by way of costs which we direct the appellants to pay to the respondent under Rule 34 of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993.