United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON
For the Respondents	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against a decision of the Registrar who has refused to extend the time for filing a Notice of Appeal in this case.

There are two decisions of the Industrial Tribunal. The first decision was promulgated on 23rd August 1996 and sent to the parties on that date. That decision followed four days of hearing at a tribunal sitting at London (North) presided over by the experienced and distinguished Chairman, Mr G E Heggs. The unanimous decision of the tribunal was that the applicant was fairly dismissed for a reason which related to his capability to perform work of the kind which he was employed by the respondents to do.

The applicant, Mr Patterson, was employed as a day centre worker by the Milton House Trust, the respondents. His employment commenced on 3rd January 1991 and he was dismissed with effect from 27th October 1994. The respondents were a Registered Charity and carry on the business of providing community-based rehabilitation for drug users or former drug users.

Mr Patterson, as the tribunal record, had a disadvantaged start to his life. He became a drug addict, rehabilitated himself and then spent the next 21 years of his life working with children with learning difficulties and young offenders.

There is no doubt from the submissions which he presented to me this morning, that he is a man of many talents and is able to provide an extremely valuable service to the community in relation to the sort of work he was doing for this charity.

The question before the Industrial Tribunal was not whether they believed him to be incapable of carrying out his duties, but whether that was a decision which the employers could reasonably have arrived at based on the investigations they had carried out; and having regard to the way they carried out the dismissal process.

After a careful analysis of the issues before them, the Industrial Tribunal concluded that the dismissal was fair. Essentially, in so far as Mr Patterson was to be criticised, it was more for his failure to satisfy the administrative requirements of his job which involved the writing of reports and filling in of other documents.

It can be said straight away, that Mr Patterson was deeply offended and upset by this decision. It is his view that much of the evidence that was given in the case by his employers could be proved to be untruthful.

He was unrepresented on the first two days of the hearing, when his employers were giving their evidence. When he was represented on the third day, which was on 24th June, they were not permitted to re-open and re-question the witnesses who had so far given evidence. He believes that had he been a skilled lawyer, he could have demonstrated to the Industrial Tribunal from the documents that were in existence, that much of what the employers had been saying was not correct. He said, essentially, that he saw the case as involving ten specific matters which he felt that he had to deal with, and which he felt he could show conclusively could not be maintained against him. He said it really was a case where the Director in charge of the centre was trying to get rid of him and was seeking any reason for doing so and effectively constructed a case for his dismissal, perhaps because the Director was of the view, rightly or wrongly, that Mr Patterson was not suited to working in the drug rehabilitation field.

No doubt mindful of the pain which the decision was causing, the Industrial Tribunal gave great attention to the application which Mr Patterson made that they should review their decision. In a reasoned decision sent to the parties on 27th September, Mr Heggs gave reasons why he was not prepared to accede to that application.

With a burning sense of grievance, Mr Patterson presents his appeal to us. He says, and I understand, that until this injustice has been corrected, he finds it difficult to get on with his life and to proceed to do the work which he recognises is of considerable potential value to the community.

But his appeal which was received by us on 9th December 1996 was 66 days outside the 42 day time limit in respect of the substantive decision, and 31 days outside the 42 day time limit in the respect of the review decision.

Mr Patterson said that he wants justice. He says that he is entitled to have the truth told. That it is a fundamental part of his own work with clients that there must be straightforwardness and honesty at all times, and he is looking for that for himself. He believes that it would be unjust if his appeal could not be heard.

Whilst fully understanding his point of view, I must remind him as I sought to do in the course of argument, that it is my responsibility to do justice according to law, which may not be the same as the justice which he believes he is entitled to.

In deciding whether to extend time and to allow the appeal, I must first be satisfied that I have been given a full and honest explanation for the delay. I have no difficulty in accepting everything that Mr Patterson felt able to tell me in that connection.

The real reason why he has not put in his Notice of Appeal before, is because he feels traumatised by the Industrial Tribunal experience, and he feels that he is in a state of ill-health, and I quote: "my life feels as if it is on hold".

He conducted a number of pieces of correspondence with the Industrial Tribunal, thinking it was to them that he should be directing his anger and his remedy. Although he readily accepted that he was given the literature which sets out quite plainly in simple language, the rights of people who are aggrieved by a tribunal decision, including their right to apply for a review and the time limit for that, and their right to make an appeal and the 42 time limit.

I have to say that I am entirely sympathetic to the position in which Mr Patterson finds himself. But I must do justice according to law. I am unable to say that he has provided me with any sensible reason for the delay in this case. He was capable of writing submissions and putting forward arguments throughout the period after the second decision, as he did so. I find if difficult to perceive any reason as to why he did not make his appeal within time. I think what can be said is that he simply failed to pay due regard to the document which he accepts would have been sent to him by the Industrial Tribunal when it gave its decisions.

That being so, I have not been provided with any sensible reason for excusing the delay, and doing justice according to law, I must therefore dismiss the appeal from the Registrar's Order.

I would like to express the view that I hope that Mr Patterson will be able to put this case behind him, and proceed to undertake the work for which he is singularly well-qualified, in my judgment, to perform, which is of immense value to the community.