United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR NAPIER (Of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON: This matter relates to the Tribunal's decision on the second Industrial Tribunal application, which Mr Taylor presented on 20 March 1996. His appeal to the Chief Executive against his dismissal failed and his complaint of unfair dismissal was heard by an Industrial Tribunal which was held at Plymouth on 8 and 30 August 1996. It is trite law that when faced with a case of unfair dismissal an Industrial Tribunal must first find what was the reason for the dismissal before they consider the fairness of the dismissal. Mr Napier, in a well presented argument on behalf of Mr Taylor, which was compelling, submitted to us that in this particular case the Industrial Tribunal had effectively failed to address their minds properly or give proper reasons for their conclusion that the dismissal was by reason of alleged misconduct, rather than by reason of the matters which had formed the subject matter of the earlier Industrial Tribunal complaint. He told us that at the Tribunal hearing Mr Taylor had tried to put in evidence his allegations against his employer in relation to health and safety matters, but the Tribunal prevented him from doing so.

We have given careful consideration to Mr Napier's submissions. The question we have to ask ourselves is whether, in the circumstances, there is a reasonably arguable point of law raised by Mr Napier on Mr Taylor's behalf. Although this will be disappointing to Mr Taylor, we have to say that we have not been persuaded that the submission made by Mr Napier is reasonably arguable.

The brief facts giving rise to the application for unfair dismissal are these: on 13 October 1995 there was an incident in which Mr Taylor was alleged to have left his duty early in circumstances in which he was not entitled to do. He was suspended on 14 October and there was then a disciplinary hearing on 21 December. On 8 January 1996 he was presented with an ultimatum, that because of this disciplinary offence, which they had found proved, he should either be demoted or he should leave their service. That appeal as I have indicated failed.

It seems to us clear that the centre of gravity of the case before the Industrial Tribunal related to the reason for the dismissal which was taken to be the incident of 13 October because that is what the whole of the disciplinary process was concerned with. The employers are required to establish what the reason was. Having established what the reason was, we are not in the slightest bit surprised if Mr Taylor was then refused the opportunity to make allegations against his employers in relation to health and safety matters. By the time the employers had concluded their case, no doubt the Tribunal had in their mind what the reason was for the dismissal and during the course of Mr Taylor's evidence, they would have been able to see for themselves whether it could be said, in this case, that the ostensible reason was not in fact the true reason. As we read paragraph 13, they are simply saying that the suggestion that alleged misconduct was not the real reason for the dismissal, was wholly unfounded.

It seems to us, in those circumstances, that the Industrial Tribunal decision which is less full than some others we have seen, but no less satisfactory, cannot be assailed in the way that Mr Napier has sought to do in his excellent submission to us. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no arguable point of law raised to challenge the correctness of the decision arrived at in this case and therefore we are proposing to dismiss this appeal.