United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MS WARREN (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


JUDGE N BUTTER QC: This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal by Ms Grant against a decision of the Industrial Tribunal at Brighton on 12 June and 6 August 1996. The Extended Reasons for the decision were sent out on 25 October 1996. Today, Ms Grant has the advantage of being represented by Ms Warren and we are grateful for her assistance.

The decision of the Tribunal below was that the Applicant had been fairly dismissed and that her claim under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was dismissed. They did find in her favour on one particular aspect of the case concerning two weeks' wages under section 53(2A) of the 1978 Act.

The Tribunal set out the background quite shortly pointing out that the Applicant alleged that she had been unfairly dismissed on 30 March 1996 and that her dismissal was on the grounds of her sex, contrary to the 1975 Act. The Respondents, the employers, contended that they had dismissed the Applicant for reasons relating to her conduct and in doing so they had acted reasonably.

The Tribunal stated in relation to the witnesses whom they heard that, wherever there was a conflict they preferred the evidence of the Respondent and the Respondents witnesses to that of the Applicant and they found a number of facts proved, which they set out in considerable detail.

The Applicant had attended an interview with Mr John on 4 March 1996 for the post of a full-time receptionist. She actually started work on Monday 18 March. The position is that, according to the evidence which the Tribunal accepted, there were immediately and continuing, a number of problems which it is unnecessary for this Appeal Tribunal to discuss in detail. They were reviewed fully by the Industrial Tribunal.

Mr John gave a letter of dismissal on 30 March 1996. He did not give any reason for the dismissal other than that stated in the letter, namely "that we do not consider that you are suitable for the position of receptionist at the salon".

Later in their decision the Tribunal said at paragraph 10:

"10. In answering this question [having referred to the question in the previous paragraph] and by reasons of our findings of fact in this matter we are satisfied that the applicant's dismissal arose from dissatisfaction with the applicant's attitude and manner adopted towards fellow members of staff."

And later, in paragraph 10 they say:

"We are satisfied that the decision therefore to dismiss the applicant was in no way connected with her pregnancy or any other reason connected with the pregnancy."

Today, Ms Warren, on behalf of the Appellant, says that the latter feels that certain questions, which she would have wished her representative before the Industrial Tribunal to put, were not allowed to be put and we have looked at a number of issues which the Appellant would wish to raise.

Where complaints are made concerning the conduct of proceedings the Employment Appeal Tribunal will often direct that the matters be set out by way of affidavit and then be referred to the Chairman for his comments. It does not follow that in every such case we think that there is sufficient substance for that matter to be dealt with in that way. It is always a matter of concern when somebody feels they have not had a fair hearing. We have to look at the overall picture here. One of the complaints made is that the Tribunal referred to and relied upon witness statements, as distinct from witnesses who gave oral evidence, with the result that those witnesses could not be cross-examined. The Tribunal clearly had to focus on what were the facts as known or believed to be by the employer, Mr John, at the material time in reaching the decision which he did. As, no doubt, has been explained to the Appellant, we have today to consider whether there is any reasonably arguable point of law to go forward to a full appeal. If there is not, then there is no point in the appeal going forward; if there is, then certainly we would allow it to go forward.

Having considered the matters which have been argued before us, we are unanimous in our view there is, in truth, here no reasonably arguable point of law.

In these circumstances and for these reasons it follows that the appeal fails and must be dismissed.