At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HULL QC
MR R JACKSON
MRS J M MATTHIAS
APPELLANT | |
(2) BERESFORD ADAMS LTD |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT |
JUDGE J HULL QC: This is an appeal to us, in our list under our Practice Direction, to see whether it may proceed. The appeal is by Mrs Valerie Booth, who was a part-time secretary who worked for 20 hours per week for the First Respondents, Allison Berry & Gray, Estate Agents. Their office was at Runcorn.
There came a time when there was a transfer of the premises, an assignment of the lease by the first Respondents to the second Respondents, who are also Estate Agents, Beresford Adams Limited. Apparently Mrs Booth was offered employment by the first Respondents at another office of theirs, but was not disposed to accept that and she was dismissed because there was no work for her at the office with the second Respondents.
So that was the situation and she complained of unfair dismissal and made a claim for redundancy pay against both Respondents, saying that there had been a transfer of the undertaking of the first Respondents to the second Respondents, so that she was entitled to proceed against the second Respondents.
The question whether there had been a transfer of the undertaking was tried by the Industrial Tribunal as a preliminary issue and we see their decision at page 3 of our papers. They heard evidence. Mrs Booth was represented and having heard such evidence and argument as was laid before them and having heard Counsel for one of the Respondents, the Industrial Tribunal said as follows:
"Having heard the evidence given by Mr Gray and the representations made by Mr Naylor and Mr Dixon the Tribunal were satisfied that this was not a case where the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 applied as the majority of the staff employed by the first respondent at the premises taken over by the second respondents had not been employed by the second respondents, indeed two of the four had been paid redundancy payments by the first respondents. In addition the first respondent did not transfer their customers to the second respondent: it was open to the customers to go with the first respondent or to seek alternative estate agents. There was no transfer of goodwill.
In the circumstances the Tribunal unanimously found that there had been no transfer of an economic entity to the second respondent and the correct respondent to the application to the Tribunal was the first respondent. The second respondent shall be dismissed from the application."
Then there was an application to the Tribunal to review their decision and the Tribunal did not, by their Chairman, reject that out of hand. They sat again with the same members to hear the application to review. They decided that the matters which were sought to be raised were either new matters, which had not been raised before them at their first hearing, or matters which could only properly be raised by an appeal and they therefore declined to review the case.
Now the appeal is brought to us and it is said that we should allow the matter to proceed. What is said in the letter, which serves as the Notice of Appeal, is that various matters should have told against the decision, should have led to a different decision. They are averments of fact concerning the transfer of the premises, of the lease, suggesting that, in fact, the Tribunal should have reached a different conclusion; that there had been a transfer of the undertaking.
Suffice it to say that we are not entitled to consider those questions of fact and substitute our own decision for that of the Industrial Tribunal. What we have to do is to look at the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and see whether it shows any error of law. On the face of it, it does not. We, of course, are concerned to see that the Industrial Tribunal have given sufficient reasons for their decision to show why they have reached the decision which they have.
We are all agreed that we should have liked to have seen a more circumstantial account of the matter given by this Industrial Tribunal. Nonetheless, having considered it as carefully as we can, we are of the opinion that this decision, the extended reasons given by the Industrial Tribunal, are sufficient to show why they arrived at the decision which they did. They are not obliged to set out all the evidence on which they decided the case or all their mental processes, provided they clearly state the grounds of their decision and, in our view, the decision is sufficient to do that, although, as we say, we should like to see a fuller decision.
In those circumstances, the appeal, which nobody appears today to support, for reasons which have been given to us by letter, cannot go any further.
We are satisfied that this is not a case where there is any arguable ground of appeal disclosed and we must therefore dismiss the appeal now and not allow it to proceed to a full hearing.