United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether Miss Cameron has shown to us an arguable point of law against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at London (North) on 17 July 1997. That decision was reduced to writing and sent to the parties on 11 August 1997. It concerned the question as to whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider Miss Cameron's IT1 complaint, alleging unfair and wrongful dismissal.

The question at issue therefore concentrated on Section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and whether it was reasonably practicable for her to have presented her complaint within the relevant time limit period which is provided for by that statute.

In fact, Miss Cameron did not have the requisite continuous period of employment to present such a complaint to an Industrial Tribunal but we understand that that issue is currently under review by the European Court and we would not, on that ground, have ruled out her appeal as being unarguable. In relation to the time limit for making complaints, namely three months, it seems to us that the Industrial Tribunal, as are we, bound by the decision in Biggs v Somerset County Council [1996] ICR 364, which, as the Tribunal have said in their decision indicates that applicants cannot take advantage of a sudden change in the law, in order to bring claims well outside the specified time limits and that it was clearly reasonably practicable for the applicant to bring her claim earlier, in spite of the advice which she received. We must hold that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this claim having regard to the fact that it was not presented within the period of three months allowed by Section 111.

In a well formulated argument modestly presented by Miss Cameron, herself, she seeks to persuade us that that decision of the Industrial Tribunal was wrong. She explained to us that she had only become a member of the N.U.T. in September 1991; her dismissal having been effected as at 31 August 1991 (at the latest). She was given advice, I think, by her trade union in November of that year, to the effect that because she did not have the requisite period of continuous service, she could not present a complaint. That advice, as the Tribunal noted, was correct at the time when that advice was given.

Miss Cameron first went to a lawyer at the end of 1993 and was also in receipt, at some stage, of advice from the Citizens Advice Bureau. She says, in effect, "well why was I not told by these people to put in an IT1?". The answer to that question lies in the fact that she has, to some extent, been the victim of a change in the law; a sudden change in the law which occurred as a result of the European Court taking on the questions which had been raised in the Seymour Smith case and as a result of domestic law, considering the Seymour Smith points.

I have to say to her that the question as to whether she has more than three months in which to present a complaint, is not a matter which has been referred to Europe, as far as I am aware. Domestic law is clear; the meaning of the words "reasonably practicable" are well fixed as a result of extensive case law. Biggs v Somerset County Council is binding on the Industrial Tribunal and it is binding on us, and as we understand that decision, the Tribunal were entirely right to have concluded that it was reasonably practicable for her to have brought her complaint earlier, despite the advice that she had received.

Accordingly we are of the view that there is no arguable point of law raised in this appeal. The Industrial Tribunal's decision was correct on the law as it is known to be at the present time.