United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR CRIGHTON (Representative)


 


JUDGE HARGROVE QC: The respondent was a catering manager employed by the appellants at a school. She had been employed since 1965 by the appellants or by the appellants' predecessor in title, there having been a transfer of undertaking between the two. The respondent had an exemplary record, but in mid-September 1996 she became ill and she did not return to work until 4th November 1996. It seems that she received a hostile reception and the evidence of Mrs Lynch was that the respondent indicated she was leaving at Christmas. The respondent denies this. The Industrial Tribunal disbelieved Mrs Lynch. There was a further meeting with Mrs Lynch on 7th November. Again there was said to be a statement by the respondent that she was leaving at Christmas, this again was denied by the respondent. As on the previous occasion, there was an entry in Mrs Lynch's diary. The tribunal came to the conclusion that either that was entered by reason of a misunderstanding, or that it had been put in not believing that there was any truth in it. There was also a claim that the respondent had made similar indications of her intention to a number of colleagues concerning leaving at Christmas. One of those colleagues was called and he was not believed.

Taking all those facts into account, the appeal today is put forward upon the basis that the decision of the tribunal is perverse. The tribunal has a duty to estimate the credibility of witnesses. They have seen the witnesses. They are the industrial jury and they have come to certain conclusions. Accordingly, on the question of perversity this appeal fails.

Further matters are put forward in the alternative. It is said that the tribunal ought to have taken account of the applicant's evidence that she was leaving any way on 11th February 1997, and therefore all, as I understand the argument being put forward, all that the respondent was entitled to was such sum as she lost between the date when she left or as the tribunal found was unfairly dismissed, and that that date which would have been the date she would have gone in any event.

That unfortunately is centred upon a basic misconception. The misconception is that the compensatory award and the basic award can never come to more than the sum which is lost between the date of dismissal and the date of eventual retirement. There are five headings upon which the basic award can be reduced, none of those apply here, and accordingly there is nothing in that point either.

There is a further claim that the tribunal erred by not being able to take into account the employer's offer to reinstate the employee.

Mr Crighton has appeared before us is unable to say whether that that was ever put forward before the Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, it cannot be therefore before us and that matter fails.

Then there is a claim that the tribunal should have come to the conclusion that the respondent had behaved in such a manner that her own conduct contributed to the dismissal. The way Mr Crighton puts that is, well if there was a confusion then the respondent must have contributed to it. As a matter of logic that argument fails as well.

Finally, it is said that no reasonable tribunal could have found that there is was an unreasonable failure to provide a written statement of reasons for dismissal, since there was genuine belief on the part of the respondent the applicant had resigned.

Bearing in mind that there is a finding that the line manager was representing matters which did not take place, the tribunal were perfectly entitled to draw their own conclusions which they obviously did. Accordingly, there is nothing in this appeal and it is dismissed.