United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR D O'DEMPSEY (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is an arguable point of law shown in a Notice of Appeal which has been lodged with the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

The Notice of Appeal is filed on behalf of Mr Morris who brought an application for unfair dismissal against Pizza Hut (UK) Ltd. That complaint of unfair dismissal was unanimously dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North) by a decision which was entered in the Register on 19th August 1996. In addition to a complaint of unfair dismissal, Mr Morris had made complaints of race discrimination and sex discrimination, those complaints were also dismissed. But as we understand the Notice of Appeal, and the helpful arguments of Counsel, Mr O'Dempsey, to us today, it is their finding in relation to unfair dismissal that is significantly challenged.

The background to the complaint and to this appeal may be shortly stated from the facts set out in the extended reasons of the Industrial Tribunal. At the relevant time the applicant was the manager of a Pizza Hut branch in Barnet. Two new employees, as we understand it, came to work in the branch. Both of them, whether independently or having put their heads together, made a complaint to the applicant's superior, alleging that he was not ensuring that all the cash taken from customers was finding its way into the tills. The employers carried out some kind of investigation into those allegations, and subsequently the applicant was dismissed.

Prior to any complaint being made about his conduct, the applicant himself had been raising, on a persistent basis, a number of complaints about the way Pizza Hut were providing facilities in the premises at which he was working. Many of those complaints were of a health and safety nature, and it is and was his case that Pizza Hut were not properly responding to those complaints which he was making. It would be automatically an unfair dismissal to dismiss a person in his position by reason of him having made such complaints. Throughout the disciplinary process the applicant persisted in raising those matters with management, and asking effectively why it was that his complaints and grievances had not been and were not being addressed by management.

The Industrial Tribunal therefore had to consider what was the reason for the dismissal as the first step to their determination of the complaint of unfair dismissal. In paragraph 9 of their decision, they record the applicant's state of mind:

"The Applicant appears to believe that [the Company] wished to dismiss him because of his complaints that he had made to the management over the health and safety and that because he had made himself a nuisance they were anxious to terminate his employment."

They also noted:

"Most of his evidence and his interviews refer to that matter but he did not give an explanation as to how the matters which were being investigated by Mr Burgham at this time had occurred."

In paragraph 11 of the decision, the tribunal refer again to a further interview at which the applicant's appeal against his dismissal was heard, and to a bundle documents which were read by Mr Dhir who was conducting the appeal. The Industrial Tribunal record that most of these documents referred to the previous history and his grievances. It was the case for the employer that the applicant refused to deal with the particular aspect which was of concern to the Company, and most of his evidence was directed to the previous grievances. The tribunal conclude:

"Mr Dhir stated that the Applicant was not prepared to answer any of the questions about the guest checks but [I think it must mean 'that'] Mr Dhir considered relevant and had been the subject of the investigation and had led to the dismissal until Mr Dhir clarified the Pizza Hut policy on various matters. This Mr Dhir refused to do and as the matter could not be progressed he upheld the dismissal."

In paragraph 15 the tribunal say this:

"Those are the facts on which we base our decision relating to these claims."

And in paragraph 15.I they find as a fact that the reason for the dismissal was misconduct in that the respondents believed that the applicant had committed acts of dishonesty.

This Employment Appeal Tribunal can only interfere with an Industrial Tribunal decision if it is satisfied that an error of law has been disclosed. It seems to us, having heard the argument of Mr O'Dempsey and having given particular attention to the Notice of Appeal which was drafted by Mr Morris himself, that there is no basis for saying that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law.

The facts on which they base their decision are those facts set out in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. It seems to us that they were correct to record as a fact the belief of the employee that the reason for his dismissal was something other than what the employers were relying on. That was one fact. It was also a fact that during the disciplinary process, the applicant did not engage with the employers in a discussion of the matters which the employers wished to raise with him, namely the allegation that he had been involved in money taken from customers not being properly accounted for in the till.

In those circumstances, it seems to us that the tribunal were not required to set out in any further detail their conclusion as to the reason for the dismissal. It was clear from the whole of the decision which is reasonably succinct and clear, that the decision to dismiss was taken on the grounds of the belief by the employers in the alleged dishonesty of the applicant.

The second finding was that the employers had made a thorough investigation of the matter and that that investigation was reasonable. Their conclusion that the applicant was at fault was a reasonable conclusion to come to in the circumstances as was their conclusion that the dismissal was fair. It seems to us that the Industrial Tribunal in this case have properly adjudicated on the complaints which were before them on the evidence which they heard. We cannot re-open questions of fact. Nor can we, so to speak, re-evaluate the evidence which was given before the Industrial Tribunal.

Accordingly, we are of the view that this appeal raises no arguable point of law fit for hearing before a full tribunal. The appeal is therefore dismissed.