United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR E HARRY (Representative)


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether Mr Smith has an arguable point of law in an appeal against the disposal of his case by an Industrial Tribunal held on 13 August 1996. Mr Smith did not attend that hearing and the Tribunal having directed their attention to Rule 9(3) Schedule 1 of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993 dismissed his complaint of race discrimination and unfair dismissal.

The circumstances in which they arrived at their decision are set out in paragraph 3 of their decision:

"3 On a number of occasions, Mr Smith sought a postponement of the hearing. On 22 July 1996 he spoke to the Tribunal office advising the Tribunal that his former representative, Brixton Law Centre would no longer be representing him. He sought an adjournment as his representative would be on holiday from the beginning of August 1996 to beginning of October 1996. The Tribunal refused that application on the grounds that there was adequate time from the end of July until the hearing date for Mr Smith to find an alternative representative. Mr Smith wrote again on 1 August seeking a postponement which was again refused by a letter dated 5 August. Finally on 12 August Mr Smith faxed to the Tribunal a request for a postponement enclosing a letter from his GP indicating that he had been to see his doctor in a very distressed state, his explanation on this occasion that his solicitor had been called away to America as a family member died. Again the application for postponement was refused by letter."

It is apparent that from a relatively early date Mr Smith was seeking a postponement of the case. That was a repeated request and eventually the Tribunal were provided with a letter from his doctor. The significant feature of this letter is that the doctor does not say that Mr Smith was unfit through sickness or ill-health, he merely refers to the fact that he came to see him in a distressed state as tomorrow his solicitor was due to represent him in a legal matter. Unfortunately the solicitor had apparently been called away.

It seems to us that the question as to whether in those circumstances the Tribunal should or should not have granted an adjournment was eminently a matter which fell within the discretion of the Industrial Tribunal. We can only interfere with decisions of tribunals where there are errors of law. The exercise of a discretion of this type is not hedged around by qualifications. It is a general discretion which must be exercised justly, having regard to all the circumstances.

The Tribunal will have had to take into account and did take into account not just the interest of the Applicant but also the interests of the Respondents who had appeared with their various witnesses, to confront these very serious allegations made against them and would have and did take into account the wider interests of justice which requires cases to be disposed of as close to the incidents to which they relate as may be.

Accordingly, this being a wide discretion, the Tribunal having correctly directed their minds to the issues, theirs is a decision with which we cannot interfere because it is not a decision which gives rise to any arguable point of law in the circumstances of this case. It cannot be said that the exercise of the discretion was perverse; on the contrary, we consider that the Tribunal have acted properly in this case.

Therefore, there being no arguable point of law, we are not prepared to accede to the application which Mr Harry, a friend of Mr Smith, was in effect making to us just now. He is not legally qualified himself. That is no handicap. We are used to dealing with people who have no legal qualification, but he was unable to indicate to us any arguable point of law and therefore no purpose would be served by adjourning this hearing to enable the Notice of Appeal to be amended. He referred, because he had been told about this by the public law centre, to a decision in 1977. I have had a look at that decision and I am satisfied that it does not lead to any conclusion that the decision of this Tribunal was in any way erroneous in law. Accordingly this appeal will be dismissed.