United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED


 


JUDGE PUGSLEY: In this case there has been no appearance by the appellant Stephen Adams. We therefore proceed to hear the case in his absence, but we do deal with the matters of skeleton argument that have been put before us.

We say for the record that this is an appeal from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal, the majority decision of that tribunal is that the applicant was unfairly dismissed on 28th November 1995. However, the tribunal made no basic or compensatory award.

What is contended on the appellant's behalf, is that the tribunal had no right to exercise its discretion to admit a statement of Joyce Hedley into evidence, and that the tribunal erred in law in reducing the basic and compensatory awards to nil.

A tribunal is not bound by the strict rules of evidence, though obviously if on a highly contentious matter the tribunal only has the evidence contained in a statement, then considerably less weight will be attached to that than if it was sworn testimony. That is a statement of the obvious.

Having carefully read the decision, we are all unanimous of the view, this is a case where it was perfectly open for a tribunal in the proper exercise of its discretion to admit the statement of Mrs Joyce Hedley. In doing so, the tribunal admitted it in evidence but said in terms it bore in mind the applicant's representatives submission and that limited reliance should be placed upon it as she was not giving evidence and could not be before the tribunal.

The tribunal in paragraph 10 sets out its findings. It preferred the evidence of the respondents. It said that the applicant did say "I have never been vindictive in my life but I am going to start now". It also found the applicant did go to Scope with the intention of causing trouble for the respondents. The fact that he was unsuccessful was not attributable to any matter on his behalf but due to the close working relationship between Joyce Hedley and the respondents. The tribunal say this in their final concluding remarks:

"The Tribunal having considered all of the evidence finds that for the purposes of section 73(7)(B), 74(1) and 74(6) it is just and equitable to reduce the basic and compensatory awards by 100%. Had it been necessary the Tribunal would also have found in relation to section 74(1) that had the correct procedure been followed it is certain that the applicant would have been dismissed by a reasonable employer. In those circumstances the Tribunal makes nil awards under the basic and compensatory awards."

We are well aware that such an order is not made save in exceptional circumstances. But the tribunal had the opportunity of seeing the witnesses, coming to the view as to the credibility of the witness, they had the opportunity of determining the flavour of the case in a way that no appellate tribunal has. We are not, in our view, allowed to substitute our discretion for that of the Industrial Tribunal. It is clear to us that the tribunal properly considered the issues before them, and they reached a decision that was open to them. We can see no error of law in this case that would justify this matter being put before the full tribunal of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. We say in parenthesis, that we have done all we can to do justice to the appellant who is not here, and consider every argument that might have been put on his behalf, but at the end of the day we have to say there is no matter that in our view justifies this going to a full hearing.