At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MISS C HOLROYD
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE
Revised
APPEARANCES
NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD: The Industrial Tribunal at Liverpool dismissed the appellant's complaint that he had been discriminated against on the ground of his race. He now appeals against that decision.
This matter comes before us as a preliminary hearing to determine whether there are any grounds of appeal which disclose an error of law such as to be reasonably arguable at a full hearing.
The appellant does not appear before us today nor is he represented.
The events giving rise to this appeal occurred as long ago as February 1992. At that time the appellant was a trainee police constable having taken up that employment on 15th February 1992. Seven days later on 22nd February the appellant attended a Manchester police station alleging that he had been attacked and the keys of his car taken. On that same night his car was involved in an accident. The clear implication was that his attackers had used those keys to take his car and one of them had been driving it at the time of the accident. He was seen on two subsequent occasions, on the second of which, in early March and in the presence of his solicitor, he accepted he had been driving his car at 3.45 a.m. when not insured and had been assaulted by several men who accused him of driving into their car. He was charge with and pleaded guilty to at the magistrates court a number of road traffic offences including driving without insurance and with defective brakes, tyres and exhaust.
In January 1993, disciplinary proceedings were brought against him. Firstly of criminal conduct relating to the Road Traffic Act offences, and secondly of falsehood or prevarication in that he knowingly made false oral and written submissions and statements.
On 12th May 1993, a disciplinary hearing took place. The appellant in effect admitted the charges. He was required to resign, a sanction peculiar to the police force, amounting to a dismissal.
He appealed to a Home Office tribunal which heard the appeal in April 1994. He then, at that hearing reverted to his original account as given to the police when he first reported the incident, in particular maintaining that he had not been driving at the time of accident and had been pressured into pleading guilty at the Magistrates court.
The Home Office tribunal rejected this version of events, and dismissed his appeal.
The appellant then brought proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal complaining that he had been forced to resign because of his race. The appellant is black and of African origin.
The Industrial Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding that the internal disciplinary hearing had no option but to find the allegations against the appellant proved and further, that there was no evidence to support the appellant's argument that he had been treated less favourably than any other police officer in a similar position if that officer had been white. As to the appeal to the Home Office tribunal, the Industrial Tribunal held that the Home Office tribunal was entitled to conclude as it did, that the appellant's late reversion was untrue and that thus there was nothing to support the appellant's contention that he had been treated less favourably on grounds of race.
The appellant asked for a review of the decision which was refused on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success. He then appealed to this tribunal by letter dated 14th July 1995.
His letter complains that the Industrial Tribunal should not have decided as it did. He asserts that he was the victim of an assault, that he has lost everything, that he was forced to make the admissions leading to his criminal conviction and had been denied legal representation.
The appeal was to come before the Employment Appeal Tribunal as a preliminary appeal on 22nd January 1996. The appellant applied for an adjournment. The request was refused by the Registrar, but appears was granted at the preliminary hearing. We find it surprising that it was granted if it was at the preliminary hearing since the unanimous and firm view of all of us is that, there is no conceivable error of law disclosed in the Industrial Tribunal's reasoning, or their conclusions that the appellant was not discriminated against by reason of race, and for those reasons this appeal is dismissed.