United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON
For the Respondent	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): By a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Nottingham on 31st July 1996, the tribunal dismissed an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is the respondent to an application for unfair dismissal brought against him by Mr P J Bloom, the applicant, that the application should be struck out on the grounds that it had failed to comply with an order made by the Industrial Tribunal that certain further and better particulars of the IT1 should be given.

This is an appeal by Mr Bloom against that part of the decision which relates to paragraph 10. In paragraph 10 of their decision, the tribunal say:

"10 Finally, we are satisfied that, in responding to the order for further and better particulars in the way he did, the applicant has conducted part of these proceedings unreasonably so as to cause the respondent to make this application. Although it has been unsuccessful, we have nevertheless ordered the supply of the further and better particulars. In all the circumstances, we think it appropriate that the applicant should make a contribution to the respondent's costs of today, that is both preparation and attendance, limited to £350."

The basis upon which that decision is criticised is set out in a skeleton argument prepared by Mr Bloom for which we are grateful. It is clearly set out.

The essence of the factual basis for the decision of the Industrial Tribunal may be stated in this way. Mr Bloom has made an allegation against the Director of Public Prosecutions that he was effectively constructively dismissed. He relies upon a whole history of conduct by the employer, the Director of Public Prosecutions, against him. which he will contend in due time justified him leaving the organisation.

The Industrial Tribunal application was lodged on 6th February 1996. The Director entered a Notice of Appearance on 6th March 1996, and on 26th March 1996 the Director requested further and better particulars. That request was not sent to the applicant directly, but in accordance with, I think, the usual practice, was sent to the tribunal. The copy of the request was then sent by the tribunal to the applicant, and was received by him on Wednesday, 10th April 1996. Not having heard anything further, the respondent requested an order for further and better particulars on 11th April 1996, which was sent to the Industrial Tribunal who made the order on 15th April 1996, and that order was received by the applicant on 16th April 1996, which was the day that he served his response to the original request for further and better particulars. He did so in a form which the Industrial Tribunal were satisfied was intended to be helpful, and that the subsequent failure to comply with the order was not vexatious or contumacious, it was not a case of a litigant not wishing to comply with court orders.

On 17th April 1996 the Director applied to the tribunal for an order that the application be struck out on the grounds that it failed to comply with the order which the tribunal had made. It was that application which came before the Industrial Tribunal who made the decision to which I have referred.

At the tribunal hearing the matter was gone into in some detail as to what should then happen so as to make the case, which was listed for hearing sometime in the near future, manageable. After considering the matter, the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that in order to do justice between the parties it was in fact necessary that the applicant should comply with the order for particulars. Normally of course, pleadings in an Industrial Tribunal are to be dealt with sensibly and not too formalistically. It is to be noted that Mr Bloom has legal training. He will have understood the need to have issues particularised with sufficient care to enable both parties to address the issues with their evidence at the hearing. It seems to us that the Industrial Tribunal were entitled to conclude that the Director's application should be dismissed provided that the applicant provided the further and better particulars which had been requested as long ago as 11th April 1996. It seems to us that we can only interfere with their decision in relation to the exercise of their discretion on costs if they have in some way misdirected themselves in law, or have arrived at a conclusion which is perverse.

Having heard the argument, we are not persuaded that the Industrial Tribunal have in any way misunderstood the proper approach to particulars. Nor are we of the view that they have taken an over-formalistic approach to the matter. They have investigated with care the nature of the complaint which is being made, and have concluded that it needs to be tied down with proper particulars.

In those circumstances, it was open to them to ask themselves the question whether the applicant had brought about the application to the Industrial Tribunal by his own behaviour, which could be categorised as unreasonable. They answered that question in the affirmative. They concluded that he had behaved unreasonably so as to cause the making of the application, he could have avoided the making of the application if he had purported to comply with the order as it had been made after the date when the respondents had applied to the tribunal for the application to be struck out and before the matter came before the tribunal for a hearing on 31st July 1996. Instead he elected not to comply with the order and asserted that he had, so to speak, sufficiently complied with it by what he had previously done. That contention was rejected by the tribunal.

In those circumstances, it seems to us, that the tribunal were entitled to arrive at a conclusion which they did, albeit that we can understand that some other tribunals might well have reached a different conclusion in the exercise of their discretion. We cannot interfere with this decision. At it seems to us that there are no grounds upon which we can say that it was manifestly wrong or that they adopted a wrong approach to it. Accordingly we will dismiss this appeal.