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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Pearce v The White House Surgery [1996] UKEAT 813_95_1801 (18 January 1996)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/813_95_1801.html
Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 813_95_1801
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
MISS J W COLLERSON
MS D WARWICK
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant APPELLANT IN PERSON
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is the Preliminary Hearing of the appeal by Mrs Barbara Pearce against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at Southampton on 3 and 12 May 1995. The Tribunal unanimously decided that Mrs Pearce's claim for unfair dismissal failed. The reasons for their decision are explained in the decision document, sent to the parties on 19 June. Mrs Pearce was dissatisfied with that decision and appealed by her Notice of Appeal served on 31 July.
The case was listed for a Preliminary Hearing in order to decide whether the Notice of Appeal raises a question of law which is reasonably arguable. This Tribunal only has jurisdiction to hear appeals from an Industrial Tribunal on a question of law. If the appeal does not raise a point of law that is reasonably arguable, no purpose is served by allowing it to go on to a full hearing at which both parties would be represented. Today, Mrs Pearce has argued her own case with the support of her daughter. We have to decide if there is any legal point in the case.
The Tribunal's decision sets out the facts. Their conclusion was that Mrs Pearce must fail in her case, because, as a matter of fact, she had not been dismissed. She had resigned voluntarily. She had not established that there was any constructive dismissal as a result of a repudiatory and fundamental breach of contract by her employers. The Tribunal came to this conclusion after hearing evidence over two days about events, meetings and discussions, which took place over a period from November 1993 to October 1994.
Mrs Pearce had been employed by The White House Surgery as a Senior Receptionist beginning on 1 February 1985. She was given a satisfactory appraisal by her employers in October 1993. The next month a meeting took place between her and Dr Barry Trewinnard on behalf of the surgery, at which criticisms were raised of her. The Tribunal referred to documents. They set out the facts relating to meetings which took place between Mrs Pearce, Dr Trewinnard and Dr Hughes. There was evidence before the Tribunal that Mrs Pearce went to see her own doctor who had diagnosed her as suffering from "stress reaction". They heard evidence about her medical condition; about her home circumstances at that time; and about her son's unfortunate illness.
They heard detailed evidence about another meeting on 10 August 1994 between Mrs Pearce. There were present at that meeting Dr Trewinnard and Dr Clarke. They set out the facts relating to that meeting. Mrs Pearce returned to work after a period absence in July and August. She returned, the Tribunal found, as Senior Receptionist. There were further meetings. The most important of them was a meeting on 12 September, attended by Dr Trewinnard, Dr Clarke and Mrs Pearce. The Tribunal accepted the doctors' evidence that at that meeting Mrs Pearce was not put under any pressure to agree to vary her terms of contract. She entered into a new contract which left her purely with reception duties with a commensurate reduction in the hourly rate of pay. She worked until 11 November. She was then signed off with a stress-related illness. Her letter of resignation dated 2 December 1994 led to this case.
The Tribunal referred to the legal question they had to decide on the facts of the case: was there a constructive dismissal? To answer that, they had to ask was there repudiatory breach of Mrs Pearce's contract of employment by the Respondents and was that a fundamental breach? The Tribunal referred to Mrs Pearce's own evidence as to what caused her to resign. She said that she had lost credibility and could not cope with the constant pressure; that after the 22 August when she returned to work, and prior to the new contract on 12 September, she was under constant monitoring surveillance. The Tribunal referred to the evidence given by Dr Hughes on the question of monitoring surveillance and said they were satisfied on the evidence that she was not subjected to the surveillance that she complained of. The Tribunal asked her at what point between the 11 November, when she signed off work, until her letter of resignation on 2 December, she had decided to resign. She said it was a few days before she wrote the letter of 2 December. She could not accept all the criticisms of her. She could not believe she could be that bad. The Tribunal said that there was a conflict on this point in the evidence of Mrs Pearce and the evidence of the Respondents. They said that, having heard evidence from Dr Trewinnard, Dr Clarke and Dr Hughes, they accepted that in preference to Mrs Pearce's evidence. They found as a fact that she had voluntarily requested, and subsequently entered into, the changed conditions of employment under the contract of 12 September. They could not find as a fact that, subsequent to that contract, there was any repudiatory and fundamental breach of the contract of employment, which would amount to a case of constructive dismissal.
That was the decision of the Tribunal. If there was no constructive dismissal, there was no dismissal. If there was no dismissal, there was no case for unfair dismissal. The Tribunal went out of their way to express sympathy for Mrs Pearce and to observe that the circumstances in which she left were sad. They criticised the Respondents for lack of sensitivity and sympathy in handling their concerns over Mrs Pearce's performance.
We have to ask ourselves: where is the legal error in the decision? The Tribunal have made clear findings of fact. They have made a correct summary, in paragraph 3 of the decision, of the law relating to constructive dismissal of an employee. Mrs Pearce has handed in to us various documents which we have read, in particular the contract of employment offered to her on 13 July 1994; a Medical Certificate from her doctor, Dr Anne Hadfield, dated 14 April 1995; a written statement given in evidence at the Tribunal by Dr Hughes; and, finally, a useful summary of the sequence of events which led up to Mrs Pearce's resignation from The White House Surgery. In addition Mrs Pearce gave us details of her recollections of her treatment. She has summarised for us the basis of her allegations that she was badly treated by The White House Surgery doctors; she was subjected to unjustified humiliation and victimisation, which was not deserved by her. There was a conspiracy by the three doctors to force her to resign after ten years of satisfactory service. She suffered bad health as a result of her treatment. She had been pressured into signing the contract in September. She had reached the stage, by the beginning of December, when she could not cope anymore with the pressure and the tense situation which had arisen; she was forced into resignation; and, for these reasons, felt that she had been subjected to an unfair constructive dismissal.
As to the hearing at the Tribunal, she felt that that had not been fair. There had been obvious difficulties in her bringing witnesses to give evidence against the three doctors. She accepted that in a Tribunal you have to prove your case, but there were difficulties in her proving the sort of case she was bringing with the help of witnesses. We have considered all these points and discussed the appeal with Mrs Pearce. The conclusion we have reached is that we have to dismiss the appeal, because we are not able to find that the Tribunal, at any point in their decision, made an error of law in deciding that there was no constructive dismissal.
Mrs Pearce may well feel aggrieved that her evidence was not accepted. She may feel that the rejection of her evidence, and the preference expressed for the doctors' evidence, was an error. But it is not an error of law. The decision on the facts is exclusively for the Industrial Tribunal. It is only if they erroneously interpret and apply the law that we can hear an appeal. They have not done that. We feel sympathy for the sadness that Mrs Pearce has suffered: we understand she suffered the additional sadness since the hearing. Her husband, who represented her at the hearing, has died. While having sympathy for her and appreciating the sadness of the case, there is nothing that we can do to question the legal correctness of this decision. There is no point in this appeal going on to a full hearing. The appeal is bound to fail for lack of a legal error in the decision. We dismiss the appeal.