United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR M GALBERG (of Counsel) Messrs A N Tzourou & Co Solicitors 139 Brighton Road Coulsdon Surrey CR5 2NJ


 


MR JUSTICE LINDSAY: We have before us a preliminary hearing in relation to Metrobus Ltd and Mrs Hillman. The matter has quite a long procedural history. There was a decision of the Industrial Tribunal on 6 March 1995, which considered Mrs Hillman's claim that she had been unfairly dismissed. Looking at the findings of fact set out in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of that decision, we see that in paragraph 13 of that decision the Industrial Tribunal accepted Mrs Hillman's evidence that she did not refuse to obey instructions and that the dismissal came about because of the argument over proposed bonus deductions and the fact that she called the actions of Mr Larking, the joint managing director of Metrobus, petty. She succeeded on the facts at that stage and the Industrial Tribunal held that it was not difficult to reach the unanimous conclusion that the dismissal was unfair.

An award was made in Mrs Hillman's favour. The basic award was £512.50, the compensatory award £2,810 and loss of statutory industrial rights £150.

Metrobus appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and there was a hearing in February 1996 that went into some detail on the issue whether there was some contributory fault on Mrs Hillman's part and they ruled that on a limited point they remitted the matter to the same industrial tribunal:

"to consider whether the part played by the Applicant in the interview on 24 August, and on 25 August, in any way can be said to have caused or contributed to a dismissal."

I might say that they said they remitted the matter with a heavy heart. That reference to cause or contribution was a quotation from the language of s.74 (6).

It accordingly came again in front of the Industrial Tribunal in April 1996 and in a relatively short decision, because they were dealing only with the limited point remitted to them, they indicated that their earlier finding had been that the Applicant did not contribute to her dismissal in any way. They considered argument put forward by Metrobus. They specifically had their attention drawn to s.73(7)(B) and s.74(6) of the 1978 Act and they say that:

"... we note that there is a slight distinction in the wording."

They thereby recognize that the wording is different and that, moreover, it is a distinction. Mr Galberg before us today complains that "slight" is really not the right adjective. I do not think it is right to pore over the reasoning of the Industrial Tribunals in such semantic detail. They did recognize that there were two different sections. They had them drawn to their attention and they recognized that they were different.

They do say in paragraph 7:

"since we did not accept the Respondent's reasons for dismissal, then the Applicant clearly could not have contributed towards it."

Mr Galberg says that there is a logical fallacy in that but I think all they mean by that is that, having not accepted the Respondents' reasons for the dismissal, that particular kind of dismissal was not one to which the Applicant could have contributed because they find that it did not exist. I do not think that paragraph 7 goes beyond that but they did in terms say, towards the end of their judgment:

"no fault of any sort lay with the Applicant.

16 We find that the Applicant did not contribute towards her dismissal and, as the Respondent has wished, we have now spelt out our reasons for so finding."

The Industrial Tribunal's reasoning is not to be pored over in the way that some statutes might be. It seems to us that there is no evident fault of law in their conclusion that no fault of any sort lay with the Applicant and that, accordingly, there is no point of law that we can identify as proper to go forward and so we do not permit this matter to go further.