At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP
MR G H WRIGHT MBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | MR M McDONOUGH (Employment Law Consultant) McDonough & Associates Linburn House 342 Kilburn High Road London NW6 2QJ |
JUDGE D LEVY QC: Mr N. Habati was employed by the Hard Rock Cafe Ltd. He was dismissed from his employment and he commenced proceedings in the London (North) Industrial Tribunal by an Originating Application, received by the Tribunal on 26 September 1994. He claimed unfair dismissal, race discrimination and made a further complaint under the Wages Act 1986.
His complaints were heard at London (North) on 11, 12 and 24 April 1996 and in Chambers on a date in May, which has been obliterated by the rubber stamp over our copy. The decision was sent to the parties on 15 May 1996. The Decision reads:
"The decision of the Tribunal is that the Applicant was not unfairly dismissed.
It is the unanimous decision of the Tribunal that there was no element of race discrimination. The claim under the Wages Act 1986 has been withdrawn."
Extended Reasons were given for the decision. From the decision, a Notice of Appeal dated 24 June 1996 was submitted on behalf of the Appellant.
There were three grounds in the Notice of Appeal, the first two of which have been abandoned before us this morning, this being listed as a Preliminary Hearing Ex-Parte of the Appeal.
The third ground of appeal reads as follows:
"(C) The tribunal have not given sufficient detail of their reasons for dismissing the application and have misapplied the law as set out in Rule 10 (4).
(i)..The tribunal state at paragraph 7 with regard to the reasons of the majority for rejecting the submission that the Applicant was treated unfairly with regard to the procedures that ' ... the dictum of Lord Bridge applies ...' . The applicant can have no idea which particular dictum which is referred to, what is the relevance of this dictum in relation to the facts and why it does not apply. No further reason is put forward and the Appellant cannot see why it is that the majority came to the conclusion that the dismissal was fair."
Pausing there for the moment, the Appellant had the advantage of being represented by a consultant below and a consultant has appeared before us today. We think that no sensible consultant should have had any difficulty whatsoever in the shorthand reference to Lord Bridge's dictum into legal longhand to explain to his client what is meant in everyday language.
The second ground is:
"The detailed arguments with regard to lack of investigation as set out above are not referred to at all and the Appellant cannot understand why these arguments were rejected. Again the tribunal do not refer to any evidence in detail or give any reasoning for concluding that the investigation was proper beyond stating at paragraph 15 'The respondents did carry out a reasonable investigation' or again at paragraph 17 'The Tribunal does not accept that there was insufficient investigation by Ms Woodward'. Beyond these bald statements no indication of the tribunal's reasoning is provided."
We turn to certain paragraphs of the Extended Reasons. After, in paragraph 1, setting out the claims which were made, there is this in paragraph 2:
"2 The Applicant was employed as a kitchen supervisor and was accused by his employers of abusing 3 kitchen-line chefs under his supervision, namely Mr Lee Walker, Mr Shelash Teli and Mr Akl Abi-Khalil. The Applicant was also accused of demanding a loan of £500 from Mr Akl Abi-Khalil."
It is fairly clear that serious allegations were made against the Appellant here. It is also clear that there was criticism of the investigation procedures adopted by the Respondents, which the Chairman and the two Members of the Tribunal found unsatisfactory and the dissenting Member of the Tribunal found that particularly unsatisfactory because the Appellant did not have English as his first language.
However, it is clear from paragraph 17 of the Extended Reasons that the Industrial Tribunal found that it was not unusual for such statements to be prepared in the way that the Respondents prepared them and they were read to the Applicant (the Appellant here) and he accepted in his evidence that he understood what was alleged against him.
In those circumstances, it seems to us, that the Tribunal does not accept there was insufficient investigation by Miss Woodward and they were entitled to find, as they did, that there were no merits in the Appellant's criticism that the Respondents should have taken statements from the members of staff.
In our view, the Tribunal found facts after they heard evidence over a number of days; they were entitled, as the majority did, to find there was no breach of natural justice, nor any significant breach of procedures such as to amount to justification for finding unfair dismissal.
The final paragraph of the Extended Reasons reads:
"19 The majority find that the Respondents had no ulterior motive for getting rid of the Applicant, that there was no conspiracy theory in connection with the Applicant being a Moroccan. They collected evidence which showed that there were three independent complaints of harassment as well as the pressure to lend money. In those circumstances the Respondents were justified in setting in motion an enquiry, and that in due course their dismissal of the Applicant fell within the band of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer. ..."
In our view, a tribunal does not have to set out everything which they find. They have reflected, in our view, the tenure of the submissions which were made by the consultant before us and must have been made before them, and they have set the position out in sufficient detail that we are able to understand what it was which was being submitted and why those submissions were dismissed.
It seems to us that this is an appeal against findings of fact which, on the matters before the Tribunal, were well within their province to find and in those circumstances, there can be no prospect whatsoever of this appeal succeeding. In so far as errors of law are alleged, in our judgment there were none.
In those circumstances, we dismiss the appeal at this stage. We thank Mr McDonough for the assistance which he has given us.