United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1996] UKEAT 570_95_1503

Appeal No. EAT/570/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 15th March 1996

HIS HONOUR JUDGE N BUTTER Q.C.

MR L D COWAN

MR A D TUFFIN CBE

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GPT LIMITED          APPELLANTS

MR D A JOHNSON          RESPONDENT

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MR H P CAMPION

(Solicitor)

Eversheds

Solicitors

14 Fletcher Gate

Nottingham

NG1 2FX

For the Respondent MR P OLDHAM

(of Counsel)

Freeth Cartwright Hunt Dickins

Solicitors

Willoughby House

20 Low Parliament

Nottingham

NG1 7EA


 


JUDGE BUTTER Q.C.: This is an appeal by GPT Limited in respect of a decision of an Industrial Tribunal at Nottingham, held on 13th March and 10th April 1995. The reasons were sent out on 13th April 1995.

The applicant represented himself in those proceedings, Mr Campion the experienced solicitor who has appeared today, represented the employers.

The unanimous decision of the tribunal below was that the applicant had been unfairly dismissed and that he be awarded compensation of £8,997.60.

The applicant alleged that he had been unfairly dismissed. The respondents accepted that he had been dismissed, but said that they were justified in doing so by reason of redundancy.

The brief facts are set out in the reasons given by the tribunal. The applicant has been employed with GTP Ltd since October 1973, that is to say for over 20 years. At the relevant time he was a Networks Quality Manager. At the end of March 1994 it became clear to the employers that redundancies had to be made. In the relevant department it was decided that a manager would have to leave. In April 1994 Dr Rimmington had a number of meetings, at one of those the managers themselves were asked to vote as to the basis upon which selection should be made for redundancy. In paragraph 4 of their reasons the tribunal say:

"whatever the vote had been, we are satisfied that he [Dr Rimmington] would have indicated that he proposed to select on a one from one basis, ... If the Managers had not agreed, we are satisfied Dr Rimmington would have informed the Managers that he proposed to select on a one from one basis, and that the person selected was the applicant because his role was seen to be a diminished one for the future."

We have no notes of the evidence given before the tribunal. But on the face of it, the passage to which I have referred amounts to an unassailable finding of fact. In our view, the effect of paragraph 4 of the decision, is that the tribunal was deciding that there had not been proper consultation because in truth Dr Rimmington had made his mind up that the one manager to be made redundant would be Mr Johnson.

Paragraph 5 is not happily worded, and if one takes out of context the words:

"We believe that the involvement of the Managers in being asked to vote must make the dismissal unfair"

we would not be able to agree with that. The passage, however, must be seen in context and the whole of paragraph 5 must be read in conjunction with the findings and observations contained in paragraph 4. The tribunal appears to have formed the view that the way in which Dr Rimmington had conducted the meeting was sufficiently unsatisfactory as to involve a defect in the process of so-called consultation, so as to be unreasonable.

Part of the argument today on behalf of the appellant does with respect get close to falling into the Polkey trap as it may be called.

We understand the concerns of the appellants arising in part from the way the reasons have been expressed, but it is important that the Employment Appeal Tribunal should look not just at specific words, but at the reasons for the overall decision. We reach the conclusion, and we are unanimous in our view, that the Industrial Tribunal was entitled to reach the conclusion which it did in respect of the question of unfair dismissal and it has not been demonstrated that they erred in relation to any matter of law or reached a conclusion on the facts to which they were not entitled to come.

So far as the question of compensation is concerned, the relevant findings are to be found at the foot of paragraph 4:

"Dr Rimmington indicated to the Managers that whoever was selected would either go on a 90 day written notice, or would be employed on a project until March 1995."

The tribunal then refer to two specific documents which we have seen, and go on to say:

"It has been subsequently suggested that the offer of project work was provisional but all the evidence indicates that it was never put to the applicant that project work was provisional upon a project being available. At the end of the day apparently no project work was available and the applicant's employment terminated on 4th August 1994, at the end of his 90 day notice period. We are satisfied that the applicant's employment should have continued until March 1995 because we are satisfied that that was the term that was agreed for redundancy."

It appears from those findings, that the applicant, Mr Johnson, was misled, albeit unintentionally by Dr Rimmington, who believed that a project would be available. Mr Johnson was led to believe that he could if he wished remain with the employers until March 1995. We have considered the various arguments presented on behalf of the appellants in relation to this, but in the end we conclude that we have no reason to doubt that the Industrial Tribunal did have material to enable it to reach its conclusion, and again we are not satisfied that any error of law or perversity have been established.

In these circumstances and for these reasons it is our unanimous view that the appeal fails and must be dismissed.