United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1996] UKEAT 1403_95_2005

Appeal No. PA/1403/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 20th May 1996

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

(AS IN CHAMBERS)

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MR C JOHNSON          APPELLANT

RUSHMOOR BOROUGH COUNCIL          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant THE APPELLANT IN

PERSON

For the Respondents MR R G STOKER

(of Counsel)

The Solicitor

Council Offices

Rushmoor Borough Council

Farnborough Road

Farnborough

Hampshire

GU14 7JU


 


MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): On 14th February 1994 Mr Clifford Johnson presented to the Industrial Tribunal a complaint of unfair dismissal, unfair selection for redundancy, constructive dismissal and dismissal on the transfer of an undertaking.

The respondents to the claim was the Rushmoor Borough Council by whom Mr Johnson had been employed as Assistant Head of Housing Property Services.

He set out the details of his claim. The council contested it and said that Mr Johnson had been dismissed on 25th February 1994 by reason of redundancy.

The case was heard in the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Southampton. The hearing started on 5th September 1994 and continued on 6th September. It was then adjourned, resumed on 27th and completed on 28th, March 1995.

The tribunal unanimously decided that Mr Johnson's claim failed. They thought that he was not unfairly dismissed. Their extended reasons for that decision were sent to the parties on 31st March 1995.

Under the Rules of the Employment Appeal Tribunal 1993, an appeal may be brought to this tribunal by serving on it a Notice of Appeal and a copy of the extended written of reasons. The period within which an appeal may be brought is 42 days from the date on which the extended written reasons for the decision was sent to the appellant. The 42 days started to run on 31st March 1995.

Mr Johnson wrote the tribunal on 18th April 1995. He was informed in a reply dated 24th April 1995 that, if he wished to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, he should complete the form, a copy of which was enclosed, and send it back to this tribunal with a copy of the Industrial Tribunal decision. It was not until 27th November 1995 that the tribunal received a letter from Mr Johnson dated 22nd November 1995 stating that he wished to appeal against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal in his case against Rushmoor Borough Council. He said in that letter that he had further evidence which had come to light. The Industrial Tribunal Chairman was also wrong in dismissing a previous judgment of this tribunal that a Mr Richard Hyde should be made to give evidence. His letter continued that there was a conspiracy against him. He enclosed various letters which he had written to others, such as the Court of Appeal. He also believed that the Industrial Tribunal Chairman had been involved in corruption through "masonic contacts" and/or was incompetent and should have no further involvement in the case.

The reference to the previous appeal to this tribunal is a reference to an appeal heard on 22nd February 1995 between the adjournment of the case from the previous September and the resumption of the case at the end of March. It appears from a copy of the judgment that the matter which came to this tribunal was the order of the Chairman of the tribunal revoking a witness order made against a Mr Hyde. Mr Hyde had initially been the subject of a witness order, but Mr Hyde then wrote to the tribunal requesting it to be set aside. The Chairman set the order aside, but this tribunal, on an appeal by Mr Johnson, allowed his appeal and said that the order revoking the witness order should be discharged. It was left to the Industrial Tribunal to consider what steps it should take to decide whether Mr Hyde should be required to give evidence in the forthcoming period. That explains the point referred to in Mr Johnson's letter of 22nd November 1995.

When Mr Johnson sent the letter on 22nd November 1995, it was pointed out to him by this tribunal that his appeal was out of time. The Registrar considered the representations made by Mr Johnson and representations made by the Council in a letter of 22nd January 1996, where the Council made clear that it objected to the application of Mr Johnson for an extension of time. The solicitor to the Council wrote:

"Mr Johnson had ample opportunity to appeal within the correct timescale. He gives no substantive reason why he did not do so. The Council does not accept either that Mr Johnson did not know of the appropriate timescale, or that lack of knowledge is a reasonable excuse. Neither does the Council accept that Mr Johnson was in fear of threats either from the Council or from the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal."

There was a further letter from Mr Johnson responding to that on 29th January 1996.

After she had considered these representations in correspondence, the Registrar made an order on 31st January 1996 refusing Mr Johnson's application for an extension of time.

Mr Johnson appeals against that refusal. He conducted his own case. Mr Stoker has appeared for the Council.

I have to decide whether an extension of time should be granted. The legal position is simple. Rules are rules. Time limits are time limits. There is a power, however, to extend the time in the exercise of the discretion of this tribunal. It is rarely exercised. The tribunal's practice is well established. If an extension of time is required, three questions have to be asked. First, what is the explanation for failure to comply with the time limits? Secondly, does that explanation constitute a good excuse for not complying with the time limits? Thirdly, are there exceptional circumstances of the case which would justify granting an extension?

Mr Johnson made many points in his submissions today. He started appropriately with an apology, because he accepted that he was in default. But he said that the explanation for this was that he was not a lawyer and had no knowledge of the requirements. He went on to explain the circumstances in which he found himself in this case. After the hearing in the Industrial Tribunal at which he had heard two days of what he said was invented evidence, he was distraught. He had been made unwell by the case. His wife was ill. He had been the subject of false accusations, of perjured evidence which flabbergasted him, frightened him and had destroyed his life. As for legal representation, he said that he was not able to afford legal advice, he did not know what to do. He did in fact seek help from many quarters after the unsuccessful tribunal hearing. He had sought help from the Police, the Serious Fraud Office. The President of the Industrial Tribunals. Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal, the Police Complaints Authority, the Home Secretary, in fact as many people as possible. He had done this because he felt that he had been the victim of a conspiracy. He had been belittled and intimidated throughout the hearing. People who had given evidence against him had done so in fear of their jobs. He suspects that there are corrupt masonic involvements in the case. As an ordinary man in the street, he is unable to deal with it.

As for the appeal, he suggested that the Chairman of the tribunal had threatened him if there was to be an appeal. He concluded by saying that he knew he had made a mistake, but he thought the tribunal had made a mistake which should be the subject of this appeal. The particular mistake, which he complained of in the tribunal, was that the Industrial Tribunal, when it had no power to do so, had overturned this tribunal's ruling about evidence to be given by Mr Hyde. He wanted Mr Hyde to give evidence. Mr Hyde had not given evidence. The most the tribunal had heard on the matter was a transcript of a taped conversation.

Mr Stoker opposed the appeal by Mr Johnson. He denied the allegations against the Council. He pointed to the reasons that the Council had relied on in correspondence with the Registrar for opposing the extension of time. Mr Stoker summed the matter up by saying that he objected to an extension of time, because Mr Johnson had not shown any satisfactory explanation for being late with his appeal. He could not therefore have an excuse. The Registrar had come to the right decision.

I have weighed up all these factors. I have read the papers with particular care, because of the seriousness of the allegations made by Mr Johnson, and his obvious sense of grievance about the way in which he had been dismissed by the Council and the way in which he thinks that his case has not been properly heard by the tribunal.

It is not my task today to deal with the substance of the complaints. I simply have to decide whether a good case has been made out, by way of explanation of an excuse for failure to comply with the time limits. I have reached the conclusion that Mr Johnson has not provided a satisfactory explanation for failing to comply with the time limits.

He was sent a letter by this tribunal in April, just over three weeks after he had been notified of the decision. It was explained to him that, if he wanted to appeal, he had to complete the form and send it back. He did not do that. It was not until the later November letter that he said he wished to appeal. By then it was too late and he has no good excuse for failing to comply with the time limits.

For those reasons, the appeal against the Registrar's order is dismissed.