United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1996] UKEAT 1303_95_2904

Appeal No. EAT/1303/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 29 April 1996

HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK

MRS E HART

MISS S M WILSON

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MS J SLADE          APPELLANT

DEVON CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY LTD          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MS C TAILBY

(Solicitor)

Messrs Pattinson & Brewer

Solicitors

11 Broad Quay

The Centre

Bristol

BS1 4DH


 


JUDGE CLARK: The Respondent is a non-profit making company limited by guarantee. It is run as a co-operative, providing support in the areas of employment, housing, credit unions, and so forth.

The Appellant commenced employment on 1 December 1992 as a Credit Union development worker on a job-share basis, working 20 hours a week. Later, each job sharer was given a separate part-time appointment. The specific task in which the Appellant was engaged was in promoting the Credit Union concept.

In late 1994 the Appellant's team leader decided that the primary development role of the team should move towards greater training capacity. A meeting of the core team in January 1995 led to a proposal that the two part-time posts be terminated and one full-time worker be appointed. A consultation process followed. The proposal was adopted and the Appellant and her co-worker were issued with redundancy notices with effect from 5 May 1995. Against that dismissal, the Appellant appealed unsuccessfully. She applied for the new full time post of Credit Union training worker but was unsuccessful. The external candidate appointed to the post was perceived to have greater skill and experience in the areas required in the new post.

An alternative post as clerical support worker to help the community economy development team came up, but the Appellant was not considered for this post, as she was judged not to have the necessary administrative and clerical skills.

She brought a complaint of unfair dismissal which was heard by the Exeter Industrial Tribunal on 13 September and 16 October 1995. Having found the facts summarised above, the Tribunal concluded that the reason for dismissal was redundancy, but that the dismissal was unfair on the grounds that the Respondent had failed to consult fully with the Appellant over the possibility of alternative employment in the post of clerical support worker and because the appeal procedure, in their judgement, was unsatisfactory. However, the Tribunal went on to conclude that even had proper consultation taken place, the result would still have been dismissal and they declined to award any compensation.


 


Against that decision she now appeals, taking essentially two points. The first is that the Tribunal was wrong to conclude that the reason for dismissal was redundancy. However, Ms Tailby accepts that the Tribunal's findings as to redundancy can be supported on an alternative ground. Section 81(2)(b) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 defines redundancy for the purposes of the Act, inter alia, as a diminution in the requirements of the business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind. Even if the work remained the same, the number of employees, two part-timers, was reduced to one full-timer. That is redundancy.

The second point concerns the Tribunal's finding that the Appellant suffered no loss as a result of her unfair dismissal. The thrust of Ms Tailby's argument is that the Industrial Tribunal failed to make any clear finding that the Appellant was unsuited for the post of clerical support worker. That is not how we read paragraph 18 of the Industrial Tribunal's extended reasons. There, the Tribunal plainly accept the Respondents doubts about her suitability for that post. They conclude that even if she had been consulted about that alternative position, she would nevertheless have been dismissed. In our view that is a judgment for the Industrial Tribunal to make. We can see no error of law in their approach which merits interference with the decision.

In these circumstances we conclude that no arguable point of law is raised in this appeal and accordingly it must be dismissed.