At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE P CLARK
MR K M HACK JP
MR N D WILLIS
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
JUDGE CLARK: Mrs Knell was employed by the respondent as a machine operator at their Bedford works from March 1992 until her dismissal on 24th May 1994.
The reason given by her employers for dismissal was gross misconduct, the allegation being that she had deliberately over recorded the number of work pieces which she had produced at her machine on 18th May 1994.
Her complaint that she had been unfairly dismissed came before the Bedford Industrial Tribunal on 3rd March and 7th April 1995. She was then represented by her husband, Mr R J Knell. Her complaint failed for the reasons set out in the Industrial Tribunal's extended reasons dated 18th May 1995.
On 23rd May 1995 Mr Knell wrote to the Employment Appeal Tribunal Registrar a letter headed "Appeal Against Tribunal Decision". He then set out grounds on which he wished to apply for a Review of the tribunal's decision under Rule 11(1)(e) of the 1993 Industrial Tribunal Rules of Procedure, namely that the interests of justice required such a review.
The Deputy Registrar replied on 5th June 1995 pointing out that a review of an Industrial Tribunal decision is a matter for that tribunal. Mr Knell pursued that route, and his position on appeal was preserved by a letter from the Deputy Registrar dated 23rd June 1995.
By a decision dated 13th July 1995 the Industrial Tribunal Chairman dismissed the review application on the grounds that it had no reasonable prospect of success under Rule 11(5).
We have before us an order by the Employment Appeal Tribunal Registrar dated 19th February 1996 refusing an extension of time to the appellant to enter a Notice of Appeal against the Chairman's review decision dated 13th July 1995.
This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether the appeal against the original tribunal decision of 18th May 1995 raises any arguable point of law which ought to go to a full hearing of this Appeal Tribunal.
That Notice raises no points of law. It is in fact an application for the review which was later dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal Chairman. Further, having looked critically at the tribunal's reasoning in the original decision we can detect no error of law in its approach to the issues raised.
There has been a recent development. By letter dated 31st January 1996 Mr Knell wrote to this tribunal. He refers to additional evidence, not placed before the Industrial Tribunal. It is doubtful whether such evidence would now be admitted by the Industrial Tribunal by way of a further review application out of time. At all events, it cannot bear on the issues raised in this appeal before us.
Additionally, Mr Knell refers to his wife, the appellant, leaving him for another man, and going to live in Cornwall.
He concludes by inviting this Tribunal to close the case.
The Registrar wrote to Mr Knell on 8th February asking for the appellants new address. No reply to that letter has been received.
In these circumstances we do not consider it right to treat this appeal as having been withdrawn by the appellant. Nevertheless Mrs Knell has not troubled to contact this tribunal to inform the Registrar of her new address or whether she has appointed a new representative to replace Mr Knell.
Therefore, in the absence of any arguable point of law, we consider it right to dismiss the appeal on its merits. That is what we now do.