At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE K BASSINGTHWAIGHTE
MRS J M MATTHIAS
MR N D WILLIS
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR D WILLIAMS
(Representative)
ISAAC
21 Claremont Road
Redruth
Cornwall
TR15 1LP
For the Respondents MR K J CADOO
(Representative)
The Legal Protection Group
Marshalls Court
Marshalls Road
Sutton
SM1 4DU
JUDGE K BASSINGTHWAIGHTE: By her Originating Application filed on 31 March 1995, Ms Chaloner the Appellant in this case, complained that she had not received her full entitlement to a redundancy payment when her employment with the Respondent came to an end on 30 September 1994.
Her complaint was based upon the Respondent's refusal to date her entitlement to include service with what, she alleged, had been an associated employer. In the Notice of Appeal dated 4 May 1995 the claim was resisted on the basis that the Appellant had received her due entitlement.
The Appellant's complaint came before an Industrial Tribunal sitting in Truro on 10 August 1995, which dismissed the complaint because they concluded that the Appellant's Originating Application had been presented outside the time limit described by Section 101 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. They also declined to exercise their jurisdiction to hear a late claim on the ground that it was just and equitable to do so, because they could identify no grounds upon which to do so. In the event we can dispose of this appeal quite shortly.
The Industrial Tribunal refused to consider (and obviously from its decision did not consider) whether Section 101, subsection (1)(a) or (b) of the 1978 Act applied in circumstances where it would appear, although the Tribunal has made no express finding, that a redundancy payment had been paid and agreed. They also, as Mr Williams and Mr Cadoo have agreed before us, considered that cases referred to them by Mr Williams, in particular that of Bentley Engineering Co Ltd v Miller [1976] ICR 225, had no application to the issue which they had to decide.
The parties before us have accepted that the Industrial Tribunal should have considered the issues which it expressly refused to consider. In particular, they are agreed that the Industrial Tribunal should have considered whether the Appellant's claim was within their jurisdiction to hear by virtue of the statutory provisions to which we have referred.
We therefore remit this case back to the Industrial Tribunal to give further consideration to the Appellant's claim in the light of the issues briefly referred to in this judgment. They erred in law in not giving that consideration at the hearing and therefore must now do so.