At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD
MR J R CROSBY
MR P DAWSON OBE
(2) MRS C SHILL
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD: This is an appeal against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, promulgated to the parties on 15 September 1995, whereby the Appellant's complaint that she had been unlawfully discriminated against by reason of her nationality or national origins, was dismissed.
This case is listed for a Preliminary Hearing in order to decide whether the Notice of Appeal raises a question of law which is reasonably arguable. This Tribunal only has jurisdiction to hear appeals from an Industrial Tribunal on a question of law. If the appeal does not raise a point of law that is reasonably arguable, no purpose is served by allowing it to go on to a full hearing at which both parties would be represented.
The Appellant does not appear before us today and is not represented. She has telephoned the Tribunal at 9.25 a.m. today to say that the bus which she was hoping to catch last night did not leave York, thus she is unable to attend. We note that she had previously not attended on a Preliminary Hearing, asserting that she was not fit to travel due to health.
We have considered her application that the matter should be taken out of the list today. In our judgement, the explanation she offers for her failure to attend is not an adequate explanation, and we therefore propose to determine this matter in her absence, on the papers.
The Appellant is an Australian national and speaks with a marked Australian accent. The Respondent is an independent market research agency employing a large number of market researchers of many different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. The Respondents routinely advertise for employees when vacancies occur at the Newcastle Job Centre.
In January 1995 the Appellant responded to such an advertisement for the post of Market Research Telephone Canvasser. She was interviewed by a representative of the Respondents who noted after interview "very strong Australian accent; hold; only wants 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. not very clear? Suitable." The Appellant was not offered employment at that time, the vacancies having already been filled by earlier interviewees that day. But she was not rejected, the note indicating that the Respondents might consider her if further vacancies occurred. On 30 January 1995 the Appellant saw another advertisement placed in the Job Centre by the Respondents, this time seeking employees for the evening shift. She telephoned the Respondent's representative who thus had the opportunity to hear the Appellant speaking over the telephone. The Respondent's representative concluded with the benefit of that experience "not suitable for any; very strong accent on the phone".
The Appellant thought she had been discriminated against because of her Australian nationality and accordingly brought her complaint to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal having heard evidence from the Respondent's training supervisor, who interviewed the Appellant on both occasions, once face to face and twice over the telephone, and from the Chairwoman of the Respondent Company, found that it was important to the Respondents that employees should be able to express themselves in a clear way. An accent, whether regional or foreign, was not necessarily a bar to obtaining employment. Where however an Applicant had a strong accent and would in consequence be difficult to understand over the telephone, employment was not offered. That was the conclusion reached by the Respondent's interviewer in respect of the Appellant.
On those findings the Industrial Tribunal rejected any suggestion that the Respondents had treated the Appellant less favourably by reason of her nationality, than they would treat other persons with a strong accent, causing difficulties in communication, whether white, black, English or foreign. There was indeed abundant evidence that the Respondents employed tele-sales staff from all manner of nationalities including an Australian. The Industrial Tribunal accordingly dismissed the application. The Appellant appeals against that decision on the ground that it is inconsistent with the evidence and taken in the absence of evidence of matter. (We simply rehearse the ground of appeal submitted.)
In our judgment the Notice of Appeal discloses no error of law on the part of the Tribunal reaching the conclusions which we have set out, and that no error of law is apparent from the face of that decision in any event. In those circumstances this appeal is dismissed.