United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1995] UKEAT 84_95_2303

Appeal No. EAT/84/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 23rd March 1995

HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC

MISS D WHITTINGHAM

MR G H WRIGHT MBE

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MR L CHAUDHRY          APPELLANT

KENNEDY & DONKIN GROUP          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE LEVY QC: As long ago as 6th February 1992, Mr Chaudhry made an application to an Industrial Tribunal, complaining that on racial grounds he was treated less favourably than others. The respondent to his application were the Kennedy & Donkin Group ("the Respondent"). A time came when the proceedings were referred to ACAS and a time came a little later when there were negotiations for the settlement of the proceedings. In the course of the negotiations Mr Chaudhry engaged solicitors to act for him.

The Respondent made an application to the Industrial Tribunal, the application brought by Mr Chaudhry had been settled when a compromise was reached between Mr Chaudhry (through his solicitors) and them. There was a hearing before an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Whittington House on 24th October 1994, to see whether the contentions of the Respondent that there was such a compromise was correct. On 15th December 1994, the decision of the Tribunal was sent to the parties. The unaminous decision of the Tribunal was that the Tribunal had no power to consider Mr Chaudhry's application further, because there had indeed been a compromise agreement.

From that decision Mr Chaudhry seeks to appeal to this court. It has come before us today on the preliminary procedure for dealing with appeals.

For the purposes of this appeal Mr Chaudhry has helpfully prepared a bundle for us of some fifty-seven pages and in the course of his address to us, he has taken us through most of them.

On page 5 of his bundle, we find the first of the grounds of his appeal:

"NO REASONABLE TRIBUNAL WILL REACH SUCH A DECISION CONSIDERING ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES."

On page 7 we find the second ground of his appeal:

"BECAUSE SETTLEMENT WAS INITIATED BY MY EX SOLICITORS I WAS UNDER DURESS AND THE ACAS INVOLVEMENT WAS NEGLIGIBLE, THE CASE SHOULD BE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL TO ENTERTAIN."

And on page 12, the third ground of his appeal:

"IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE THE CASE SHOULD BE HEARD."

We will first consider what he says in "Ground No: 2". The basis of his appeal, is that, as is said there, that there was duress involved when he reached a settlement. There were findings of fact made by the Industrial Tribunal and it is clear to us that there must have been evidence to support those findings of fact. Paragraph 8 says:

"The Applicant does not dispute that he gave his solicitor's instructions to settle the case for the sum of £500. On 5 October 1993 the Applicant solicitor's sent the Respondents a fax, which they copied to the Industrial Tribunal office."

At the end of paragraph 15, having gone further into the facts and into the law, the case to which the Tribunal referred to being Gilbert - v - Cambridge Fibres Ltd 1984 IRLR 52, the Tribunal say this:

"We therefore think it is clear, on the evidence before us, that the parties did reach a binding compromise agreement in this case."

Paragraph 16 on the decision continues:

"The Applicant clearly feels a strong sense of grievance with regard to the conduct of these proceedings by his former solicitors. Those solicitors were not present nor represented before us, and it is therefore wholly inappropriate for us to express any view on his grievance which, in any event, is not a matter within our jurisdiction. However, if the Applicant does have a grievance against his solicitors then he must pursue that matter through other channels. So far as these proceedings are concerned, we consider ourselves bound to hold that the Respondent are entitled to say that they have entered into a binding agreement whereby these proceedings have been concluded."

In the course of his address to us, Mr Chaudhry has attempted to go into the facts which must have been gone into below. All of us individually attempted to explain to him it is not open to him on appeal to give evidence to us. Further, he has in the course of the address to us read out certain passages in his bundle which were not in evidence below. This was another way of attempting to give evidence to us.

We reject his attempts to introduce evidence on the appeal. We are quite sure that there were facts before the Industrial Tribunal which were quite sufficient to entitle the Tribunal to come to the decision it did.

Mr Chaudhry has in the course of his address attempted to distinguish the decision in Gilbert - v - Cambridge Fibres Ltd. He refers us to the differences in the facts in that case and in this. The differences in the facts do nothing to detract from the principle which was decided in that case. That decision was as binding on the Industrial Tribunal as it is on us. Even if it were not binding, it would be powerful authority which we would be reluctant to ignore. We therefore reject Ground 2 of the Appeal.

As to the other two grounds, Ground 1 alleges perversity in the decision below. We do not consider that the decision was in any way perverse. Ground 3 alleges that in the interests of justice, that there should be a full hearing of this appeal. If there is a full hearing, the Respondent will incur additional costs. As there is no point of law in which Mr Chaudhry can succeed, we cannot see why it would be just to allow the appeal to go forward.

In the circumstances we will therefore dismiss Mr Chaudhry's appeal at this preliminary stage.